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Abstract 
 
The subject of this thesis is the debate between infallibilism and fallibilism in 
epistemology. Rather than the usual approach of trying to enscaplutate intuitions 
regarding the meaning of the term ‘knowledge’ with a set of logically necessary and 
sufficient conditions, I have instead – following Edward Craig’s book ‘Knowledge and 
State of Nature’ (Craig, 1990) – begun with an hypothesis about the role of the concept in 
everday life, and used this to construct a picture of the prototypical case of ascription 
when this purpose is properly fulfilled. The hypothesis employed is that the concept is 
used to ‘flag good informants’, and the primary methodological technique employed is 
consideration of the situation of an individual inquirer in the state of nature. Later on (in 
Chapter 2), considerations brought in by the fact that life in a primitive community is 
inherently social are brought in, thus complicating the picture; the effect is to derelativize 
it from the individual situation of the enquirer and bring it closer to the familiar analyses 
of the literature (with which I make various comparisons). I use the picture of the concept 
of knowledge thus constructed as a basis to argue against the infallibilists’ positions in 
chapter 3, and construct a positive alternative in chapter 4. 
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 3 
1. The State of Nature 
 
 
1.1 Introduction: Nature and Purpose of Project 
 
This thesis will aim to contribute to a debate in Epistemology, namely that between 
fallibilism and infallibilism. In this thesis I will argue that infallibilism about knowledge 
is false – that is, knowledge ascriptions can be made correctly whilst the infallibilist’s 
conditions are not met. 
  The structure of the thesis will proceed as follows. In this chapter, I will propose a 
methodology under which we can approach the problem, and various other problems 
along the way: this is, with a few modifications, the strategy of ‘conceptual synthesis’ 
found in Edward Craig’s book ‘Knowledge and the state of nature’ (Craig, 1990). This 
approach proceeds by first hypothesizing a role for the concept of knowledge, and then 
investigating the features we should expect a concept suited to this role to have. In the 
second chapter I will begin carrying out this investigation, arriving at a broad outline of 
the concept of knowledge, and then categorizing it according to distinctions such as 
internalist/externalist. 
  In the third chapter I will use the Craigean framework to argue against infallibilism 
about knowledge. There are various formulations of infallibilism I shall consider; 
Unger’s non-accidentalism, the exclusion principle, the ‘conclusive reasons’ formulation 
found in Dretske. In the fourth and final chapter I will explore how the Craigean position 
fits in with recent developments in the literature – referring to the work of Jason Stanley 
– which claim that facts about practical rationality must be incorporated into the truth 
conditions of knowledge ascriptions. 
  My thesis may thus be seen as complimentary to Craig’s project: I aim to extend his 
ideas to a particular problem that he discusses in his book only briefly – that of whether 
or not knowers must be in some sense infallible – and further develop his position by 
forging a connection between his work and subsequently published literature. 
  In the opening pages of his book ‘Knowledge and the state of nature’, Edward Craig 
describes the most commonly addressed problem in modern epistemology – that of 
providing an analysis of the meaning of the term ‘know’ and its cognates. The standard 
approach in attempting to answer it is to try to characterise the term’s extension, as 
ascertained by exploring our ‘intuitions’, with an explicit intention couched in terms of 
necessary and sufficient conditions (p1). However, he claims that this project is deficient 
in at least two respects.  
  The first respect in which it is deficient is that we not only have intuitions about the 
term’s extension, but also intuitions that relate more directly to its intension: hence in a 
given case, we might not only feel that a subject is or is not in possession of knowledge, 
but also have an idea of why it does or does not qualify (because the subject came about 
their beliefs by accident, for example). Craig goes on; ‘The sceptic notoriously tries to 
show that the two do not mesh: our intuitions about the intension, the conditions of 
application of the concept, in fact determine a much smaller extension than that which 
our directly extensional intuitions mark out’ (p1). If the two sets of intuitions disagree 
then it is not clear how to progress, and philosophers will swiftly become divided into 
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opposing camps. Moreover, this is even supposing that there is such a thing as a stable set 
of intuitions about the extension (or intension) of the concept that do not vary from 
person to person, or with the context in which an umpire is asked. 
  The second respect in which this project is deficit, or at least limited in scope, is that 
even supposing the former line of enquiry were brought to a conclusion there would still 
be a puzzle remaining: why is it a term whose meaning is given by precisely these 
conditions that we find worth bothering to demarcate and talk about? Even supposing (I 
shall have something to say about this in the next section) that knowledge is something of 
a ‘natural kind’, so that its demarcation would not be arbitrary, we might still wonder 
why it is that knowledge thus understood plays such an important role in our lives. 
  An alternative approach to this aim of analysing the term ‘knowledge’, one which Craig 
suggests will be more promising, is to begin not with an intuitive extension but rather an 
hypothesis about the role of the concept of knowledge: how it is used in everyday life, in 
pursuit of certain very general practical needs. Given this hypothesis, we may then 
explore the properties a concept suited to this role would have, and proceed to an analysis 
of the phenomenon of knowledge itself. We will thus have another criterion of success: 
as well as fitting at least reasonably well with both our extensional and intensional 
intuitions, the concept we construct should be fit for use in this particular role. Moreover, 
such a project would clearly be far better suited to tackling our second question about the 
importance of knowledge: at least part of the reason it finds such an important role in our 
lives must be its usefulness in answering to these needs. Craig goes on: ‘Such an 
investigation would still have an anchorage point in the everyday concept: should it reach 
a result quite different from the intuitive extension, then, barring some special and 
especially plausible explanation of the mismatch, the original hypothesis about the role 
that the concept plays in our life would of course be the first casualty’ (Craig, 1990, p.2), 
whence we would need to start from scratch with a different hypothesis.  
  Because of this emphasis on the role of the concept in everyday life, the approach thus 
described has strong connections to the tradition of naturalism, which is described by 
Craig as one in which ‘thinkers see man, his behaviour and institutions, as natural facts to 
be understood as the (broadly speaking causal) outcome of other natural facts… What 
concepts we use, what linguistic practices are common amongst us, these are special 
cases of input to the more general naturalistic enterprise’ (Craig, 1990, p9). The 
hypothesis Craig suggests, then, is that the purpose of the concept of knowledge is to 
‘flag good informants’ regarding anything we might be (usually practically) interested in 
finding out about. I shall argue that if this hypothesis is correct, then knowledge is best 
seen not as something absolute and rarely attained, but rather an important social 
institution; a commonplace relation to which we all stand in with respect a large number 
of everyday propositions. 
 
 
1.2 Objections to the Conceptual Strategy 
 
Before elaborating the method in more detail, I will pause here to anticipate two potential 
objections. The first is: why should we concern ourselves with the concept of knowledge, 
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rather than investigating the phenomena of knowledge itself? As Craig points out (p3)1, 
there are situations where the conceptual strategy will not yield any interesting results: 
for instance, the point of the concept of water is to enable us to talk and think about 
water, and no amount of analysis of the role of this concept will allow us to learn 
anything new about water itself. In response, Craig suggests that ‘Knowledge is not a 
given phenomenon, but something that we delineate by operating with a concept which 
we create in answer to certain needs, or in pursuit of certain ideals’ (p3). Thus the limits 
of knowledge do not mark the transition from one objectively distinct kind of phenomena 
to another, but are rather drawn in place in response to certain practical needs: in other 
words, knowledge is not a ‘natural kind’, and it is the concept and associated conceptual 
practises that are primary. Hence in order to understand the properties that knowers must 
possess and why, we must look to the forces that govern our conceptual practices (which 
we may take to be the actual application of the term in day to day life).  
  How might we argue for this claim? Rather than arguing for it directly, Craig instead 
claims that the ‘proof is in the pudding’: he suggests proceeding with his experiment, and 
resting his case upon the explanatory power of the analysis that he develops, and the light 
it sheds on debates within the literature that had otherwise seemed stalled.  
  Although pursuit of this idea would take us two far afield, there is another line of 
thought that might be worth following. Later I shall argue that belief is necessary for 
knowledge, and many thinkers have claimed that belief is not a natural kind. For 
example, in the intentional psychology of Daniel C. Dennett (Dennett, 1989, p15) we find 
an ‘instrumentalist’ attitude towards belief: although beliefs do corresponding to 
objectively existing patterns, we should not expect to find individually distinguishable 
elements in the brain corresponding to distinct beliefs; beliefs and other intentional 
entities are seen as primarily theoretical constructs that derive from concepts which are 
projected onto individuals in order to make sense of and predict their behaviour (we 
adopt the ‘intentional stance’ towards them). If beliefs do not constitute a natural kind, 
and knowledge is intimately connected to belief, then it becomes plausible to suggest that 
knowledge is not a natural kind either.  
  A second objection to Craig’s proposal is that some philosophers may have concerns 
about the prospective value of this endeavour: why should we be interested in everyday 
conceptual practise at all? ‘Surely’, a critic might respond, ‘there is a difference between 
what knowledge is, and what people say it is. If our only aim is to describe popular, 
everyday usage of the term, then we have ceased to even be doing Philosophy.’ The 
thought is that although this kind of project might be interesting to a linguist or a 
sociologist, a philosophical analysis of knowledge should go beyond everyday usage and 
aim at an analysis of knowledge proper. As Philosophers we should provide a 
prescriptive rather than a merely descriptive account, because our particular set of skills 
leave us better placed to determine its nature and proper application than members of the 
population at large.  
  My response to this concern (which again draws on Craig’s ideas) is twofold. Firstly, we 
are not merely aiming at a description of certain linguistic facts, but also seeking to 
clarify certain aspects of conceptual practice: we can analyse the proper deployment of a 
concept suited to the role we have hypothesized, not the de facto way in which it is 
                                                
1 Where not specified, references are to Craig, 1990. 
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currently deployed. Thus the prescriptive element is introduced at a different place. If we 
were only interested in linguistic usage, the question would be trivial: it is clear that 
people in general do not make the demands the infallibilist insists they should when 
ascribing knowledge. As we shall see, there are three levels of analysis by which we can 
proceed, and this objection is only really appropriate to one of them (the ‘descriptive 
framework’ – see section 1.4 below). 
  Secondly, if, as we have claimed, knowledge is not a natural kind but rather a 
phenomena delineated by our conceptual practises, then constructing a concept suitable 
for a particular role may be the best kind of analysis we can hope for. It might be true that 
the purpose we now need the concept for is different from the one in relation to which it 
arose, but by grasping the connection between the everyday concept as it stands and its 
initial purpose we are better placed to make any adjustments that might be necessary to 
tailor it to be suitable for our current concerns (such as deployment in science, for 
example). I will not pursue this last kind of project, but there is certainly scope for 
utilising the ideas presented in this thesis in this direction, should the reader be 
dissatisfied with the goal I have aimed at here: namely a description of the actual concept 
we currently have, elucidation of the pressures that caused it to develop in this particular 
form, and a description and explanation of how we operate with it in everyday life. 
 
 
1.3. The State of Nature; Informants and Sources of Information 
 
In this thesis I will thus be pursuing what might be called a genealogical method: looking 
at the development of the concept of knowledge and the everyday conditions under which 
it arose. To this end, a useful tool in the naturalist’s arsenal is what we might call a ‘state 
of nature’ approach, which may be familiar from its employment in political philosophy, 
and is perhaps best described in an epistemological context by Bernard Williams in the 
opening chapters of ‘Truth and Truthfulness’ (Williams, 2002), or by Edward Craig in his 
book. This approach aims to develop what Craig has elsewhere called a ‘practical 
explication of the concept of knowledge’ (Craig, 1986/7).  
  In order to account for the universality of the concept of knowledge – Craig notes that 
‘There seems to be no known language in which sentences using ‘know’ do not find a 
comfortable and colloquial equivalent’ – we begin with imagining a primitive situation: 
we consider the needs of some individuals living together in a (possibly quite primitive) 
society. They will be in possession of language, and some degree of cognitive 
sophistication, and have some interest in cooperating with one-another. One should not 
assume that individuals living in such primitive societies necessarily have what we might 
consider to be primitive needs; however, we shall start from consideration of needs of 
quite a general and basic kind, needs that inevitably emerge whenever human individuals 
live together in a society, and hence may be thought of as uncontroversial features of the 
human condition. If we find the explanatory power this approach to be lacking, we may 
then go on to consider needs of a more sophisticated kind. Given these basic needs, then, 
and some degree of reflective intelligence, we should expect that the concept of 
knowledge will emerge because of its usefulness in fulfilling them (the exact details of 
this ‘emergence’ will be the subject of the next section). 
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  In order to meet the challenges of everyday life, each individual in our society must 
acquire information about the world, such the location of food, predators, competitors, 
and mating opportunities. Although false beliefs can occasionally be helpful, the best 
strategy for achieving their goals will be for them to aim at acquiring true beliefs about 
these variables. Such true beliefs can often be acquired directly through sensory 
experience and inference, and for most of our beliefs this is probably how we do indeed 
proceed. However, some individuals may be much better placed to provide input on a 
given question – because they possess special abilities, perhaps, or simply because they 
were conveniently located at the time of some event. The members of our society would 
therefore do well to share information with each other, thus distributing the epistemic 
burden in a cooperative drive for survival and prosperity.  
  To this end, certain concepts will be useful in determining which sources of information 
are reliable and which are not. Craig’s proposal is that the purpose of the concept of 
knowledge is to ‘flag approved informants’ regarding the truth of some proposition p. On 
a technical note, Craig often talks as though our inquirer seeks to find out whether some 
proposition p is true or false, but the inquirer is not always in such a privileged position: I 
may be enquiring about the whereabouts of some individual whilst having no idea about 
where he is, and so in general my enquiry will not take on this disjunctive form. 
However, as long as we bear this in mind, we may adopt Craig’s ‘whether p’ disjunctive 
form of the question as it is far more convenient, and bears more similarity to the 
standard ‘knows that p’ construction discussed in the literature. 
  I have said that the purpose of the concept of knowledge is to flag approved informants 
on a given question. There is a distinction between an informant and what is merely a 
source of information: a book may be a good source of information about many things, 
but we do not attribute to it the status of knowledge. How can we account for this fact 
from the ‘state of nature’ perspective? In other words, why not have a single locution for 
all sources of information, rather than a narrower concept that only applies to good 
informants? Craig’s answer to this question is twofold.  
  The first reason is convenience: given that we speak the same language (I shall have 
more to say about channels of communication in the next chapter), once we have found a 
good informant we can find out whether p simply by asking an appropriate question, 
whereas a source of information may require expert or specialist knowledge to analyse. 
Someone who knows whether p is in some sense (other factors concurring) able to ‘tell us 
whether p’: the concept of knowledge has a social function that would not be met by 
mere sources of information.  
  The second consideration, which rules out more convenient sources of information like 
books, is that a good informant will often act cooperatively by providing collateral 
information that is not explicitly requested: he or she may be able to ascertain or partly 
ascertain our purpose for wanting to know whether p, and are often empathetic towards 
our enquiry (this is especially true within a small primitive community in the state of 
nature). If I stop a man on a street in London and ask him where the nearest tube station 
is, in addition to answering he may also decide to tell me that the station is closed that 
day, or that there is no service on the Piccadilly line.  
  It is not merely that the entities to which we attribute belief must have agent 
characteristics, but rather that a good informant whether p – and hence one who knows p, 
ex hypothesi – must be able to convey to us whether p in a special way. To take Craig’s 
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illustration, a man who is soaking wet may be a good source of information about 
whether or not it is raining outside simply because we can tell by looking at him. He may 
well also know that it is raining as well, but this does not follow straight away from the 
fact that he is both a good source of information and a fellow human being. We are using 
him as an informant only if he is able to tell us whether p – not simply if we infer it from 
facts about his physical appearance, say, which would be merely to make use of him as a 
source of information.  
 
 
1.4 Methodology 
 
In the next sections I will be more explicit about the methodology we will be employing, 
and the form we should expect our theory to take. We have claimed that the role of the 
concept of knowledge – to point out approved informants – is somehow responsible for 
the conditions by which it is delineated. It is time now to be more explicit about the 
relationship between these two things. On page 10 of Craig’s book we have:  
 
‘I shall not treat [the concept of knowledge’s] development diachronically, and that is not just an 
omission: if what I shall say is along the right lines, the core of the concept of knowledge is an 
outcome of certain very general facts about the human situation; so general, indeed, that one cannot 
imagine their changing whilst anything we can still recognise as social life persists. Given those 
facts, and a modicum of self-conscious awareness, the concept will appear; and for the same reasons 
as caused it to appear it will then stay.’ 
 
It would be useful to try to give more detail about what is meant by ‘an outcome of’ here; 
likewise for ‘the concept will appear’. Naturalism comes in degrees, and we may 
consider a variety of different proposals: 
 
• To deduce the features of the concept it would rational to construct, given its 
purpose (the ‘rational’ framework) 
• To deduce the features of the concept that is likely to develop organically as a 
practical strategy for ascription, given the conceptual niche available (the 
‘strategic’ framework) 
• To describe the features empirically found in real-life knowledge ascriptions, 
bearing our hypothesis about the role the concept plays in mind (the ‘descriptive’ 
framework) 
 
In the first kind of project, we would try to make precise what is meant by a good 
informant, and then imagine constructing a concept perfectly suited to the role of flagging 
such individuals as part of a general epistemic strategy for acquiring true beliefs (what 
the concept of knowledge should be like). Should an individual possess all the properties 
this concept includes, then he or she must be a good informant by virtue of this fact. 
However, even in this level of analysis we must also take into account the fact that to be 
suited to this purpose the concept must be applicable by one situated individual to another 
(or, as we shall discuss, to oneself), as we shall see this will requires the informant to be 
detectable (in the next chapter I shall discuss apparently counter-intuitive instances of 
people who we would like to say are knowers without giving any indication of this being 
the case). We are not rationally identifying particular individuals from a global 
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perspective, but rather imagining rationally constructing a concept for a certain purpose (I 
will elaborate on the importance of this point in section 1.6, below). 
  In the second kind of project, which is in many respects very similar, we consider the 
kinds of practical advantages we can gain from finding a good informant, and deduce the 
concept that would best help us to maximise them. The processes that cause this 
conceptual development may include evolution by natural selection: we have said that 
belief is a part of knowledge, and it is likely that biology has something to say about our 
belief-forming mechanisms. However, we are not limited to this framework alone; for 
example, those who find conceptual schema which lead them to material success of 
influence may use the power thereby gained to coerce others into following their usage – 
none of this resting on the idea that concepts are innate. At this level of description, the 
concept will (ideally) be the outcome of predictions from various branches of science, 
which deal with all the real-world forces that influence our conceptual practices.  
  Whereas at the rational level the concept would be tailored to ensure the individual in 
question was labelled a knower only if they were a good informant, at this level such a 
restriction is not in place: we want the concept to capture good informants in general, but 
it is likely to be strategically advantageous to allow some individuals who are in fact not 
good informants to fall under the scope of the concept in exchange for satisfaction of 
considerations like simplicity, ease of applicability, and ensuring that the majority of 
those who are good informants are labelled as such. 
  The third kind of analysis embarks upon the sociological project mentioned and 
criticized in section 1.2: to investigate how the concept of knowledge is employed in the 
everyday world. Two options suggest themselves, but each has their drawbacks. The first 
is to perform some kind of Gallup pole to catalogue intuitions regarding proper usage of 
the term ‘knowledge’. However, the answers we receive will likely not accurately reflect 
their conceptual practises, but rather some idealized version of it (as Lewis’s 
contextualism nicely captures, the conditions governing people’s ascriptions of 
knowledge often become more stringent at the mere mention of Cartesian demons). The 
second would be an analysis of large samples of recorded dialogue (spoken and written) 
to see how the term is used: but this kind of analysis cannot easily distinguish genuine 
usage from that which is merely metaphorical ascription and not to be taken literally, or 
‘loose use’; that is to say merely a convenient approximation. These methodological 
problems will not particularly concern us, however: our advances in this direction will be 
restricted to a few platitudes about everyday usage that should prove intuitive and 
uncontroversial (such as that the term is frequently applied in real life). 
  Rather than committing to just one of these three styles of account, then, we may try to 
bear each of them in mind, carefully balancing our analysis of the core of the concept of 
knowledge between explaining the empirical facts of usage and deducing how we should 
expect them to develop or be chosen, given the various pressures to which humans living 
in a society are inevitably subjected. Clearly the sociological facts of usage are after not 
enough to go by; given that knowledge is factive it is an uncontroversial fact that 
knowledge is often ascribed incorrectly (some writers, such as Unger, whose views we 
shall consider in chapter 3 below, have claimed that almost all knowledge ascriptions are 
false). But conceptual schemas are not something that are wholly rationally constructed; 
nor are they the outcome of blind evolutionary and developmental processes, but more 
somewhere between the two. As mentioned in section 1, if the actual facts of usage differ 
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wildly from the concept we predict to evolve organically, perhaps we should take this to 
suggest that it is likely that these predictions are mistaken, and should at the very least 
question our assumptions or method to see where the discrepancy may have arisen. 
  With any luck we may find that some features are present (or not present) whichever 
approach we adopt, and by noting that this is the case – that all three approaches are in 
agreement – we stand on firmer ground in asserting these features to be part of the core of 
the concept.  
  One last point: we are concerned with knowledge in general, and not with any particular 
kind of knowledge – perceptual, mathematical, etc.: although usually p will be some fact 
about the immediate world around us, we have not specified in any more detail what it 
will be about. So if our hypothesis is correct, the features we delineate will be neutral as 
regards this also. 
 
 
1.5. Form of the Theory 
 
Before we proceed with exploring Craig’s hypothesis that knowers are good informants, 
it will be helpful to say a few words about what kind of analysis we are looking for. As I 
have mentioned, the usual form in which an analysis is given is that of a list of 
individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions, such that meeting them with 
respect to p and knowing whether p are mutually entailing. However, it also seems that 
whatever set of conditions one might give, one of two things happens. Either there is the 
possibility of ‘Gettierization’ – finding situations where the conditions are all met, but 
intuitively knowledge ascription should be withheld; or else the analysis becomes so 
demanding that is scarcely met at all in everyday life, if ever.   
  Does the approach of looking for features that characterize a concept suitable for 
flagging good informants help with this problem? Not directly, no: consideration of the 
features involved in being a good informant is unlikely to yield anything so precise as a 
set of necessary and conditions. Take belief, for instance: in the next chapter I will argue 
that for the most part a good informant will need to have true beliefs on the subject in 
question (a proposition p, say). But despite this, we can imagine cases such as Colin 
Radford’s ‘French Canadian’ Jean (Radford, 1966/67), who as a result of prior instruction 
that has now passed from conscious memory is able to accurately answer questions on 
British history, despite apparently having no beliefs on the subject. Thus, including belief 
as a necessary condition would exclude Jean, who seems as helpful an informant as one 
could wish for, whereas to leave it out would seem to imply that the notion of belief plays 
no role in the analysis of knowledge – and this is surely problematic in itself. 
  What Craig does suggest to remedy the situation is a change of track. If it is correct that 
knowledge is a phenomena delineated only with respect to a particular kind of conceptual 
practise, and not by the limits of some natural kind, then there is no reason to expect the 
most illuminating analysis to even take the form of a set of necessary and sufficient 
conditions at all. Rather than looking for such a set, then, what we will instead aim to do 
is to look for a description of the prototypical case; that is to say, to highlight those 
features which are usually or almost always present when the concept is ascribed, even 
though we might be able to imagine exceptions: 
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‘what may look like an attempt to state necessary conditions should rather be taken as part of the 
description of a prototypical case, a case from which speakers and their audiences will tolerate, in 
the right circumstances, varying degrees of deviation. How much deviation, and under what 
circumstances, ought to be related to the purpose behind the formation of the concept in question. 
The prototypical description enshrines the features that effect realisation of the purpose when things 
are going on as they nearly always do.’ (p15). 
 
  In describing the prototypical case, we are looking for a description of those features 
that are usually present when the purpose that we have hypothesized the concept of 
knowledge to serve is fulfilled, and rarely present otherwise. Despite being closely 
associated with the fulfilment of the purpose, and hence part of the core of our inquirer’s 
conceptual strategy (and thus knowledge itself), these features are not logically necessary 
or even sufficient for adequate fulfilment of the purpose. Viewing the role of the concept 
as primary thus helps to explain disagreements about the wealth of purported 
counterexamples to popular analyses of knowledge that philosophers are so fond of 
constructing and citing as decisive: we may feel of a particular case both that many of the 
usual features of knowledge are present, but also that the role the concept is supposed to 
play is for some reason left unfulfilled. Conversely, one might construct cases in which 
the usual features of the situation are not present (such as Radford’s example) but there is 
an intuitive resistant to the concept of knowledge being withheld: ‘if our hypothesis is on 
the right track, it is neither surprising that so many take belief to be essential to 
knowledge, nor that some deny it, nor that many people’s intuitions leave them in the 
lurch at this point’ (Craig, p.14). Everyday practise gives us no way to legislate over 
these examples, and there is no reason why it should.  
  On a related note, the problem with the usual method of trying to imagine 
counterexamples to a proposed analysis is that this approach often does little to shed light 
on why the analysis is supposed to fail. Moreover, ‘imagine’ is perhaps the operative term 
here: the counterexamples that philosophers often like to emphasize, if genuine, are 
sometimes so rare that their impact on everyday conceptual practise is limited. Recall that 
our inquirer is concerned with a practical strategy: oftentimes it will be costly in time and 
energy for our inquirer even to detect those cases where knowledge is present but the 
usual features are missing, so in practice they will simply be passed over and a more 
accessible or readily identifiable informant sought instead. Therefore, the inquirer’s 
strategy will aim at the prototypical case, and indeed ‘one might almost say that for 
practical purposes what the concept amounts to is the essential description of the 
prototypical case.’ However, Craig goes on: ‘the words ‘almost’ and ‘for practical 
purposes’ are not in that sentence for nothing, however. One thing a proper account of a 
conceptual practise ought to be able to explain is why prima facie counter-examples to 
the proposed definition have (at least prima facie) the feel of such.’ (p15/16) Our attitude 
towards such cases, where they concern us, then, should not be to try to legislate based on 
‘intuition’, but to shed light on these contrary pressures and how they lead to 
disagreement. 
 
 
1.6 The Situated Viewpoint  
 
In order to further clarify the differences between the naturalistic approach we are 
pursuing and more standard ways of proceeding, it will be helpful to introduce a 
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distinction between what might be called ‘global’ and ‘situated’ perspectives (c.f. Pfeifer 
and Bongard, 2007). An analysis beginning from a global perspective starts with all of 
the facts of a given (often imaginary) situation to hand, and goes about deciding whether 
ascriptions of knowledge are appropriate to a given individual. These facts generally 
include the truth as to whether p, the individual’s relationship to this fact, and various 
other details about his or her epistemic state and embedding in the world – even if these 
are not accessible to any individual present in the scenario. 
  In contrast, when taking the situated view, we imagine a real individual situated in the 
world, having limited information about his or her environment (including as to the truth 
of p), and deciding whether or not to ascribe knowledge to another individual, despite not 
having all the facts to hand about their beliefs, intentions and history; or on the first-
person approach (although I shall argue in the next chapter that the third-person approach 
is in some sense primary), deciding whether they themselves know whether p.  
  In this thesis I am pursuing an analysis from the situated perspective. Our inquirer will 
be embedded in the real world, which entails certain restrictions: acquiring information 
requires time and energy, sensory equipment is subject to disturbances, there is constant 
subjection to time pressures (things happen even if they do nothing); they interact with 
the environment, and these actions (including the overt application of concepts) change 
this environment in various ways. Further to this, the situated approach implies an active 
concern with one’s own practical interests: unlike Descartes’ ‘Pure inquirer’ – to borrow 
a phrase from Bernard Williams (Williams, 1978) – the situated inquirer begins with 
epistemic needs (amongst others) he wishes to fulfil. He then adopts a practical strategy 
aimed at doing so, and part of this strategy will be the way in which he uses and applies 
concepts. 
  Given this framework, the strategic approach asks: ‘which conceptual strategies might 
we expect to develop (by whatever means) to enable individuals in our society to flag 
good informants?’ – and the rational approach asks ‘if our goal was to flag good 
informants, which conditions would deliberation on this aim lead us to insist were present 
for conceptual application?’ And of course, the descriptive framework always takes place 
under real-world conditions.  
  Again, it will be worthwhile to pause here in order to address a concern that might 
present itself when we take this perspective; one analogous to that which was raised 
about the value of pursuing a naturalistic approach in general: why should we care about 
how knowledge looks from the situated viewpoint, instead of raising ourselves to a global 
one? Aren’t complications brought in by considering an individual’s particular situation 
at ground level mere prejudices, to be overcome by philosophical reflection?  
  The first point to make here is that it is the situated view that has been important in 
shaping the everyday conceptual application, and I have argued for the value of taking 
this conceptual application as primary. So if we are pursuing this naturalistic approach 
(and I have argued above that there is benefit in doing so) then this is the position that an 
effective enquiry at this level will have to work with. Moreover, the considerations that 
the situated viewpoint lead to cannot but bear influence on our intuitions about the proper 
application of the concept of knowledge – even when we try to divorce ourselves from it 
in our philosophical endeavours (for one thing, its influence will permeate our language). 
  A second consideration is that in any case our conceptual strategies do not fall apart 
once the inquirer gains a firmer grasp of the facts. For instance, oftentimes after using the 
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information obtained we will come to find out the truth about p after all, and supposing 
we had picked an informant who gave us the right answer then this would not then 
undermine their claims to knowledge in any way. More generally, we will find that the 
status of being a good informant is invariant with regards to increasing information on 
behalf of the inquirer: if some new facts serve to undermine his status as such later on, we 
will have been wrong to attribute the status of an approved informant in the first place. 
The account of knowledge aimed for is ultimately of such a kind that we will be able to 
say whether or not a given case qualifies from a global perspective (or at least whether it 
is part of the prototypical case). However, in developing this analysis it is considerations 
arising from the situated view that we will consider. Moreover, if we follow the classical 
tripartite analysis of knowledge, an analysis of belief and truth will come out the same 
from either perspective; as we shall see, it is only in motivating the third condition that 
this perspectival distinction will prove to be important. 
  We have seen how taking the situated rather than global perspective has lead us to 
construct our analysis from the position where we do not know whether p ourselves: to 
borrow another phrase from Bernard Williams, we are in the position of ‘inquirers, not 
examiners’. The situated view can also give an explanation as to why we should have 
counterfactual or modal concerns: knowledge is ascribed from a position of incomplete 
information, which marks out a range of ‘open possible worlds’ – that is, a range of 
worlds that are not excluded by our experiences hitherto. Because we cannot exclude the 
possibility that we are in any of these open possible worlds (that any of them are the 
actual world), our only hope of finding an informant with true beliefs whether p is to find 
one who has true beliefs across most or all of them (just how demanding we will be here 
remains to be seen, in chapters 3 and 4). From the global perspective we might think we 
only want our informant to be correct in the actual world, and in a sense this is true, but 
the problem with this is that it leads to no strategy on the part of our situated inquirer. 
  In general, as mentioned earlier, when we begin from the situated perspective we will 
also find that the features of the concept must be in some sense epistemically available in 
order to be worth bothering about for our inquirer. These points will be considered more 
carefully in subsequent chapters, and their importance for the debate we are addressing 
pursued. 
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2. The Concept of Knowledge 
 
 
2.1 The Tripartite Analysis  
 
As mentioned in the introduction, in this chapter I will describe the concept of knowledge 
as it emerges from consideration of our hypothesis, and then go on to categorize it 
according to various distinctions found in the literature. Lastly I will deal with some 
proposed counterexamples to the hypothesis. 
  The purpose of the concept of knowledge, we have said, is to point out individuals who 
are good informants whether p, in order to ourselves acquire true beliefs whether p. 
Moreover, an informant is distinguished from a mere source of information partly by a 
capacity to ‘tell us whether p’. This given, we shall want to find someone who tells us the 
truth about p. Now, from this assumption Craig reasons as follows: 
 
‘The informant, we may assume, will not in general tell him [the inquirer] the truth unless he (the 
informant) holds a true belief about it. (Cases of people who, whilst not holding true beliefs, 
insincerely give ‘information’ which is in fact true, are rare; and informants who do that regularly 
are as good as non-existent.)’ (p12) 
 
Moreover, informants will only be of use to us if they express themselves with enough 
confidence to convince us: ‘if he is successfully to induce the belief that p in his 
audience, he had better believe it himself’ (p13).’ In the prototypical case, then, our 
informant will possess true beliefs whether p, and be sufficiently confident of this belief 
that once they tell us that p (or not-p), we will then ourselves come to believe p (or not-
p). (As mentioned, we may agree with Radford that the belief condition is not strictly 
necessary, but it is nevertheless so common that we may take it to be part of the ‘core’ of 
the concept of knowledge: see chapter 1, section 6.)  
  We might initially think that nothing further than true belief is needed by our practical 
inquirer, and in a sense this is right: all that they really need in a good informant is for his 
or her views to be true and for them to have the confidence to express them convincingly. 
However, recall that the purpose of our naturalistic enquiry is to find the practical 
conditions under which knowledge is ascribed (or better, correctly ascribed). As I have 
mentioned, most of the time we will not know the truth about p ourselves, or else we 
would not bother to look for an informant. What we are really after is someone that 
believes p if p is true, and not-p if p is false (the similarity with Nozick’s tracking account 
of knowledge will be pursued in the next section). We must be able to distinguish 
informants with true beliefs about p from our situated perspective where there are all 
sorts of other things about the world we simply do not know, and be able to do this 
without ourselves having prior knowledge as to whether or not p is true. 
  In the background of other conditions that also correlate well with being a good 
informant (such as being to some degree rational), the fact that the informant has a belief 
whether p, or is confident about whether p, is a good indication that what he or she will 
say on the subject is accurate, and hence that we should come to believe them too. 
Indeed, this is part of the motivation behind our emphasis of the belief condition: we do 
not look for confident informants because we find confidence attractive, but rather 
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because, other things concurring, it is a good indicator of correctness (it is thus only of 
indirect importance). However, confidence is not the only indicator we use, and not even 
one we are always willing to trust: there are other properties a potential informant may 
possess that indicate their having true beliefs (or false beliefs) whether p, and some of 
these may be more reliable. At this point, it seems that any such property will be 
sufficient for the purposes of the inquirer; call this the ‘minimal analysis’ – that 
knowledge is true belief together with some detectable property indicating that this true 
belief condition is met (whether we really need this ‘detectability’ constraint will be 
addressed in section 2.6, below). 
  One question that we will be concerned with throughout the remainder of this thesis is 
whether to express this property (that indicates true beliefs whether p) in modal or 
probabilistic terms (Craig often conflates these two notions; for example, on p86). Are 
we after an informant that is correct across a certain range of possible worlds – perhaps 
across all worlds that, for all we know, do not obtain? Or are we after someone who is 
(either objectively or epistemically) very likely to be correct? These two notions do not 
coincide, but there is at least the semblance of affinity between them: for instance, 
usually someone who is known to be correct in almost every possible world is also likely 
to be correct in the actual world. This question will be answered in chapter 4, but for now 
we shall remain non-committal on this issue and stick to Craig’s formulation – that what 
our inquirer is after is: 
 
‘[S]omeone who believes the truth about p, and has some detectable property X, possession of 
which correlates well with being right about p, that can guide him in his choice of informant.’ 
 
In particular, the property must be detectable to persons lacking direct access to the truth 
about p. Moreover, any such property will do, so long as the agent conveys the 
information with the ‘informant’ characteristics outlined above: this property X will not 
be specified in any more detail, as there are as many such properties as things we could 
want to know about. If we want to know how to get to Piccadilly Circus, the – quite 
readily detectable – property of being a London Taxi driver will suffice. Just what is 
involved in this ‘correlating well’ clause will occupy us a great deal throughout the 
thesis: indeed, in a sense this question contains the essence of the debate under 
consideration. One last point before we move on: the connection between this property X 
and being right about p must be reliable or law-like as well as graspable, and not just a de 
facto connection that holds in this particular instance (otherwise the inquirer would not in 
general be able to discern that the informant was in fact suitable for his purposes). 
 
 
2.2 Comparison with other Projects 
 
In chapters 3 and 4 of his book, Craig makes a comparison between the minimal analysis 
as presented in the previous section, and four other attempts to analyse the concept of 
knowledge: the Nozick/Dretske counterfactual tracking account, Goldman’s causal 
theory, reliabilism, and the classical ‘justified true belief’ (JTB) analysis. Although I will 
not be able to pursue this in as much detail, a few brief remarks will be helpful at this 
juncture. 
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  The reader will recall that in the Nozickean tracking account, the third condition is 
decomposed into two subconditions, namely sensitivity: that in possible worlds that are 
close (i.e. worlds very similar in p-relevant respects) to the nearest possible world to the 
actual world in which not–p obtains the subject does not believe p, and adherence: that 
the subject’s beliefs are the same in all close possible worlds where p has the same truth 
value.  
  Craig has two comments to make on this approach. Firstly, according to our practical 
explication as outlined so far, Nozick selects the wrong range of possible worlds: there is 
no reason for our inquirer to care about worlds he has ruled out as being non-actual. 
Although we shall see in section 2.6 that things become more complicated when we 
consider that our inquirer will in general not operate alone but from within a linguistic 
community, on the simple analysis it appears that all an inquirer should care about is 
what the potential informant believes across the range of possible worlds that is open to 
him, the inquirer. Under the strategic framework, an open possible world is best 
understood as one that has not been excluded as a candidate for being the actual world by 
that subject’s experience; under the rational framework, it is a world that they do not 
know is not the actual world. Consideration of some such set of worlds will automatically 
bring the counterfactual property in its train: recall that in general our inquirer will not 
know whether p obtains or not, and hence this set of open possible worlds in which the 
subject is required to be correct will contain both worlds where p is both true and false. 
  The second problem with Nozick’s account is that the truth of these counterfactuals is 
not epistemically accessible in the appropriate way: our inquirer has no convenient 
faculty for judging whether these conditions hold. So at best satisfying the 
counterfactuals will be something that correlates well with the property we are looking 
for: it may be present nearly all of the time that the property X is present, but it cannot be 
the property itself (again, whether this detectability requirement is really necessary will 
be considered in more detail in section 2.6 below). 
  Next, Craig discusses Goldman’s causal theory of a posteriori knowledge, which 
analyses knowledge whether p as true belief caused by the fact that p, with the proviso 
that the subject be able to reconstruct the salient links in the causal chain. There is a good 
deal of similarity to Nozick’s project here, as a causal connection is prone to bringing 
counterfactual conditions in its train. And again, it appears that according to our 
methodology this formulation also misses the mark for the same reason: this property will 
not in general be epistemically accessible to the informant. In order to judge whether a 
belief is causally connected to the fact that it is a belief in, we will usually need to know 
that the fact actually obtains; and of course our inquirer is rarely in such a position. 
Granted, there are cases in which this is not the case: we may believe the causal 
connection holds because we saw him looking in the right place at the right time, for 
instance (p14). But in these cases it is some other feature of the informant we use to 
ascertain that the causal connection holds – here simply that he was looking in the right 
place – and it is this other, more basic feature that we are really looking for.  
  Let us now look at the reliabilist formulation, which analyses knowledge as true belief 
acquired by a reliable method. It is true that for a nearly all of our beliefs there is 
something like a method behind their acquisition, and if this method is reliable then the 
subject must be a good informant, given their beliefs are correct. But as far as looking for 
a property that a subject is in possession of which correlates well with being right about 
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p, the property of having come across p by a reliable method is only one such indicator; 
we have already mentioned another we are likely to sometimes use in some cases, namely 
being confident about one’s beliefs. Other kinds of properties, such as being a London 
taxi-driver, do the job just as well – and being a London taxi-driver is not a property that 
can be equated with coming about with certain beliefs about the local geography of the 
city, even though it is true that all competent taxi-driver will have used some such 
method.  
  According to the state of nature perspective, then, our inquirer will not so much be 
concerned with the method by which the beliefs are acquired, as by whether there is 
something about the informant that indicates that their opinion on the matter in question 
is going to be reliable. What they want is for the detectable property X to be reliably 
connected to being correct whether p. This given, counterfactual and causal conditions 
may creep in (but in a non-standard way) in ensuring this condition holds: if being 
reliable (in a law-like way, recall) requires causality (Craig thinks not), then there will be 
necessarily be a causal element involved; if it involves the satisfaction of counterfactuals 
(this time Craig thinks it does) then these will have to be met too. But again, as these 
conditions are indirect consequences of other parts of the analysis, we may stick with the 
minimal formulation as it currently stands. Likewise, to consider the JTB analysis, having 
a good reason for a belief is a reliable indictor that it is correct, but not the only such 
correlate.  
  According to Craig, all four of these approaches are good approximations to the 
minimal analysis, which seem plausible because in so many cases the detectable property 
X happens to be something that makes them come out true (especially given what we 
have said about the importance of the prototypical case). As Craig puts it:  
 
‘What makes them seem plausible is not the concept of knowledge, but certain very general beliefs 
which we all hold. These are, in particular, beliefs about the extent to which the world is a system of 
causally inter-related states, more specifically beliefs about the extent to which belief-states are 
themselves the end-product of a causal process; the belief that for nearly all human beliefs, there is 
such a thing as the method by which they were acquired; and the fact that human beings are usually 
conscious of certain stages of the processes by which they arrive at beliefs.’ (p34) 
 
 
2.3 Globalism versus Localism 
 
In this section we will discuss the first of three distinctions that have been drawn in the 
literature in order to categorize various epistemological approaches, and will be 
instrumental in developing the arguments against infallibilism found in the next section. 
The globalism/localism distinction is usually discussed in terms of reliabilism: recall that 
the reliabilist approach to knowledge claims that knowledge is true belief acquired by a 
reliable method, whence the question arises of whether in order to count as leading to 
knowledge whether p the method must be reliable for determining the truth of a range of 
other p-like propositions. For our purposes, this issue turns on whether to count as 
knowing whether p it is necessary that S is also a reliable informant on a range of other p-
like questions (presumably only in a localist sense, to prevent explosion), and if this is the 
case, which range is the appropriate one. 
  As Craig points out (p.54), McGinn (1984) has objected to Nozick’s account of 
knowledge on the grounds that it only refers to the specific proposition p, and includes no 
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clause that quantifies over a range of other p-like propositions. However, Craig also 
points out that there are prima facie counterexamples to the claim that any such global 
reliability is required: an infant might know its own name despite not knowing the name 
of anyone else. The later example may be taken to suggest that the descriptive framework 
indicates globalism is false: but it is not clear that statements expressing the names of 
other individuals are the appropriate class of p-like propositions in this instance; perhaps 
what the infant also needs to know is a further range of facts about himself to count as 
really knowing her own name. Likewise, I might know the answer to 1720 because I have 
worked it out on paper, whilst not knowing the answer to any similar-looking calculation 
such as 1719 or 1721; but maybe the range of things I need to know about here are not 
other calculations but more general mathematical principles, such as the mechanical 
procedure of calculation, the fact that when properly implemented it leads to true results, 
and so on. 
  However, if we admit (as many authors do) what must be consequence of our 
hypothesis, that knowledge can be transferred from an authoritative source (perhaps 
insisting that the individual learning the information be aware of their standing), then 
there will be a large number of examples where globalism does not obtain; when the 
authoritative source on the subject (a professor specialising in that field, perhaps, or a 
quizmaster on a television show backed by a team of researchers) tells another individual 
some isolated fact p for which there is no range of related p-like propositions the learning 
subject is aware of. Because knowledge attributions of this sort are common, specific 
conditions relating to globalism are not part of the core of the concept according to the 
descriptive framework. 
  Let us, then, consider things from the rational framework. Supposing we are looking for 
a good informant whether p: would it be rational for us also to insist that they are also 
likely to answer correctly on a range of other p-like questions? On the face of it, it seems 
they are not: we are only interested in learning whether p, and to include extra conditions 
about other p-like issues would only serve to exclude individuals perfectly well-suited to 
our purposes. However, recall that one of the two key reasons for only ascribing 
knowledge to good informants rather than otherwise convenient sources of information 
such as books was that a good informant was often able to spontaneously provide 
collateral information relevant to our concerns whether p: if we want this to be the case, 
perhaps some version of globalism will need to apply as a consequence. 
  If there were such a condition motivated for this reason, it would either have to be either 
very broad (the subject needs to also know about every possible contingency that could 
be relevant to our concerns with p; which is surely too strong, given the belief 
requirement), or the range of p-like propositions specified will be highly contextually 
determined, and dependent not just upon the semantic content of p and our concerns with 
its truth, but also the specific details of the circumstances surrounding our relation to it 
(all the things we in particular, and at that particular time, might need to know collateral 
information about). However, from the strategic framework there is an alternative way in 
which we can see to it that this concern with the possibility of gaining collateral 
information is satisfied, so that again there is no reason to think that globalism is correct. 
  Our inquirer, we have said, seeks to find out the answer to some question p, and hence 
also seeks a good informant that amongst other things has some (detectable) property X 
that correlates well with being right about p, which has the property of being law-like, in 
 19 
order to support inference to new cases. Now, in the majority of cases, possession of the 
same property X will also correlate well with being right about a range of p-like issues: if 
Sam is a good informant about whether the cat is on the mat because he is looking 
directly at it, he will also be a good person to ask about the shape and size of the mat too. 
  Combined with this observation, we may note that it is usually easier to find a subject 
with a more general correlative property than a specific one: in order to know the date of 
a particular battle we look for a subject with a firm grasp of the relevant period of history, 
and not simply one that knows this one particular fact. Thus strategically we will do 
better in general to look for individuals that also know about a range of p-like 
propositions, if only as a consequence of the fact that we are looking for informants in 
possession of more general correlative properties than is strictly necessary. This range of 
p-like propositions will depend not on the semantic content of p itself but rather the 
means by which we as inquirers come to know that a subject knows whether p.  
  We thus have seen that there is no reason to expect our situated inquirer to directly care 
about the informant’s reliability on anything other than the question at hand; reliability in 
these other cases is a bonus that comes about from the way we identify good informants 
whether p, rather than something that is part of the core of the concept itself. Hence as the 
globalistic properties only come about as a consequence of other elements of our analysis 
– that the individual must possess some property indicating that they are likely to be 
correct whether p – we may leave a description of it out of our constructed concept, and 
opt for localism about knowledge instead. 
 
 
2.4 Internalism Versus Externalism 
 
The internalist/externalist distinction turns on whether in order to count as knowing 
whether p, the subject needs to themselves have some grasp of the fact that they fulfil the 
third condition for knowledge. Hence for us the relevant questions are whether to include 
any clause to the effect that S must grasp that they possess the correlative property X, and 
the related question of whether they need to themselves grasp this connection between 
possessing X and being a good informant whether p. 
  In the next section I shall argue that a third-person (as opposed to first-person) account 
of knowledge is the firmer starting point. Now, from the third-person set-up – i.e. 
consideration of the case where an inquirer must decide whether an external informant 
should be ascribed the status of knowledge – it initially seems that there is no reason to 
think internalism about knowledge is correct. All that is required of a potential informant 
is that they possess the appropriate property; whether or not they realize this to be the 
case is irrelevant.  
  However, recall that we are also required to detect such informants, and moreover the 
reasons behind distinguishing good informants and mere good sources of information 
were related to the convenience of being directly told whether p. Two points are relevant 
in this regard. The first is that it might be true that sufficiently confident belief whether p 
is usually (in almost every instance) accompanied by a grasp of the facts that justify this 
confidence (i.e. that the subject possesses the property X). This given, the internalist 
condition would have something like the status of the belief condition: whilst not 
logically necessary for being a good informant – it is certainly possible to be very 
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confident without a grasp of the reason underpinning this confidence – it may nonetheless 
be part of the prototypical case, especially where confidence is an appropriate attitude to 
take. Against this line of thought, Craig counters: 
 
‘But be that as it may, we have still found one point on which the supporter of the belief-condition 
can call which has no analogue for the internalist: the lack of belief seriously disrupts our 
willingness to think of the subject as an informant rather than an evidential source of information. In 
part, at least, this happens because we are then reluctant to regard him as properly telling us 
whatever it is that he says. (p.63)’ 
 
Moreover, the inquirer has no direct concern with the informant’s grasp of the correlative 
property in regards to its supporting an attitude of confidence; all that matters is that the 
informant has the required property and believes confidently enough to attract our 
attention (i.e., the two conditions are separable, and the latter need not be based on the 
former). Hence these reasons are not enough to suggest that our inquirer’s conceptual 
strategy will have a built-in internalist condition. 
  A second point to note, and one that I think bears more weight, relates again to the 
convenience of a good informant. Recall that what our inquirer wants is someone that can 
properly ‘tell them whether p’, as opposed to merely being a source of evidence in 
regards to their question. But if this emphasis on convenience is correct, perhaps we 
should also insist that they are able to tell us that they possess the correlative property X, 
rather than being expected to infer this from detectable facts about them. And telling us 
that they possess X (in the sense we are interested in) requires them to appreciate this fact 
– hence the internalist’s condition follows.  
  In response, we might ask why someone who accepted this line of thought should stop 
here: an informant can certainly express his belief that he possesses the correlative 
property X, but we need a reason to think this utterance is reliable. Again, either we can 
look for some property X* that correlates well with being reliable about this sort of thing, 
or we can insist that the inquirer reliably tells us that he or she possess such a property. 
But then the same point can be raised again, and so on. Where on this scale should we 
stop? 
  Again, I think the answer is that we should stop before the first iteration, insisting only 
upon belief whether p. To argue this, I will appeal to the three frameworks of analysis 
discussed previously. Beginning with the descriptive framework, oftentimes we do 
ascribe knowledge when the internalist condition is not met. This is the outcome of two 
more general facts: that subjects possessing such a property do not always consider 
whether or not this is the case, and further that we do not in general have access to the 
facts about whether a subject has considered the issue or not. Hence in some proportion 
of the cases where we ascribe knowledge the subject will possess some such property X, 
but will not meet the internalist condition.  
  From the rational stance, it seems clear that all a practical inquirer really needs from a 
good informant in order to find out whether p is that they possess some such property X; 
grasping this to be the case is not necessary, and it would not be rational to exclude 
informants simply because of the fact that they do not. Hence the rational stance also 
favours externalism. 
  Lastly, let us consider things from the strategic point of view. If the subject is aware that 
they possess the property X, then surely this will be useful to us in identifying that they 
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do possess it: for example, the question of ‘how do you know?’ may then enable us to 
determine whether or not they are a good informants based on their response. So would 
our inquirer do well with a strategy aimed at just these kinds of good informants? 
  The answer, I think, is no. The subject expressing to us that they possess some such 
property X is only one way we come to identify that this is the case; it is not a dominant 
prototypical feature that occurs in almost every instance (other ways we might come to 
see that they posses such a property include awareness of their social or professional 
position, our own knowledge of their whereabouts at a particular time, direct perception, 
the testimony of others, and so on). Hence, a strategy aimed exclusively at informants 
satisfying the internalist condition would only allow an inquirer to make use of a small 
subset of potentially helpful informants. 
  Lastly, we can now also answer the second question raised at the start of this section: 
given that we do not require the subject to be aware that they possess the correlative 
property X, there would be no reason for us to require their awareness of the fact that just 
this property correlates well with true beliefs whether p either. Again, it may useful 
(given they know they possess X) to suppose they are aware of the connection; it might 
make them more ready (or more able) to identify themselves as good informants whether 
p. But it will not be necessary, as in general there are other ways we can come to know 
about this connection. 
 
 
2.5 Third Person and First Person Perspectives 
 
Philosophers often distinguish between first person and third person accounts of 
knowledge. In the first-person case, we take as the paradigmatic case of knowledge 
ascription the situation where we apply the concept to ourselves, and express (to others or 
ourselves) that we know some fact p (or not-p) to be the case. Conversely, by taking a 
third-person analysis we have in mind the case where, seeing some external subject, we 
decide to ascribe to him knowledge whether p, thus endorsing him as a good informant 
on the subject (either for our own clarity or, as we shall see in the next section, for the 
benefit of others). Which of these two approaches our methodology favours will depend 
on the relative influence that judging others versus judging ourselves as good informants 
have had in shaping the associated conceptual practices which we have claimed are the 
origins of the meaning of the term ‘knowledge’. In emphasising the distinction in this 
section I am not claiming that different concepts will ensue when adopting one style of 
explanation over the other, but simply looking for a clear starting point that is as firm as 
possible. 
  So far we have essentially had implicitly in mind a third person investigation, but the 
‘state of nature’ methodology is not necessarily limited to this approach: indeed, 
oftentimes it is me that is best placed to evaluate and subsequently put myself forth as a 
good informant. However, I will argue in this section that we should take the third-person 
scenario as our starting point.  
  Craig suggests one potential line of justification for this emphasis on third person 
ascription – that first person judgments require more quite sophisticated reflective 
abilities: ‘To find oneself in possession of a belief on the question whether p pre-empts 
inquiry; to take a self-conscious look at one’s own apparatus with the doubt in mind that 
it may have delivered a falsehood calls for a considerable degree of sophistication.’ (p11) 
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He claims that we should pursue the third person approach, then, because the less 
cognitive capacity a phenomena requires imputing to our individuals, the less 
controversial is the claim that it is an inevitable feature of life in any human society. By 
being conservative in the abilities necessary to find oneself in our starting position, we 
thus broaden our enquiry: even if we should later find a reason to move to the first-person 
view, until such reason arises it is ‘just good method’ to keep our approach as general as 
possible.  
  However, although the introspective approach may require sophisticated abilities some 
of the time, it seems that it needn’t always: for instance, suppose I see what I initially 
believe to be a tiger in the distance, but subsequently take into account how the foggy 
weather means that this belief is unreliable. I have evaluated my status as an informant, 
and hence the applicability of knowledge, without doing anything particularly 
sophisticated at all – certainly nothing that could not be done in the state of nature. 
Moreover, it is well known that infants below a certain age have no ‘theory of mind’ – 
they are unable to fully understand external subjects having false beliefs, whilst 
understanding the possibility of their own views having been false. If this is correct then 
Craig’s argument is not particularly convincing. Let us, then, pursue the question of 
which style of account we should pursue using the frameworks from chapter 1. If the 
concept of knowledge following from the starting point we will adopt disagrees markedly 
with actual usage this will become apparent later on, so let us move on to the 
developmental approach.  
  Now, although it is in fact not clear that it requires more complex cognitive abilities, it 
seems correct that third-person application does enjoy numerical advantage: it is simply 
far more common for us to become involved in judging whether another individual is a 
good informant than to find ourselves making the same judgment about ourselves. Even 
granted that most of our beliefs are formed directly, as opposed to from the testimony of 
others, we do not necessarily need to employ the concept of knowledge in order to 
acquire these beliefs, and although we may be an appropriate subject for knowledge 
ascription there is no reason why we should have to step back and reflectively assess our 
status as informants in more than a very small proportion of these cases. Moreover, it is 
the inquirer that initiates the dialogue regarding the particular question at hand, and has 
easier access to facts about the circumstances surrounding his enquiry (I shall have more 
to say about these later). 
  This given, and assuming the two diverge at all (I think in fact they probably do not), 
then a concept designed to meet the demands of third-person ascription will be in general 
more useful for the inquirer to possess, and so this is the concept we may expect to 
develop under the strategic framework. Moreover, the same result follows if we consider 
which concept it is rational to construct. If our hypothesis is correct, then the only reason 
we could have for constructing a concept that labels ourselves as good informants would 
be to recommend ourselves as such to others. But then supposing there is some 
divergence in how the concept will develop between the two styles of account, it will be 
of no use for the semantics of ‘knowledge’ to be suited only for a first-person scenario in 
these divergent cases, because the point of the first person version of the concept is to be 
able to present oneself as a good informant to others. Presumably everyone will be 
willing to assert that their own beliefs are correct; others will in general seek independent 
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grounds to believe us. In short, the importance of this usage of the concept is derivative 
from the third-person case.  
  For these reasons, the best conceptual strategy will aim at the third-person scenario as 
its prototypical case, and we may expect the meaning of the term ‘know’ to follow. 
Hence in the following sections and chapters we shall take as the prototypical case of 
knowledge-ascription that of attributing knowledge to an external individual, as this is the 
‘firmer theoretical starting-point’. 
  One last point before we move on: in ‘Knowledge and its Limits’, Timothy Williamson 
has put forth the influential view that ‘knowledge is the norm of assertion’ (Williamson, 
2000). In other words, one should only assert what one knows (or – following Stanley, 
2005, whose views we shall consider in more depth in chapter 4, one should only act on 
what one knows). This leads to an alternative hypothesis with more of a first-person 
character, which might likewise be pursued along Craigean lines: that the purpose of the 
concept of knowledge lies in evaluating whether we are in a position to make certain 
assertions. But if what I have said about the third person approach being more 
fundamental is correct, exploration of the current hypothesis is best completed ahead of 
this project, although it may certainly have a role in tidying up any phenomena the 
current project leaves unexplained. Moreover, the two hypotheses are not contradictory to 
one-another: there is clearly a close relationship between being a good informant whether 
p and being justified in asserting whether p. 
 
 
2.6 Objectivisation  
 
Up until this point, we have been working with a rather simplified picture of information 
transfer in our primitive society: we have imagined an isolated inquirer seeking potential 
informants amongst the other individuals living in his or her society, without any input or 
help from others. However, life in a society is not quite like this: for example, our 
ascriptions (or withholdings) of knowledge are often performed publicly, which in turn 
affects how others act. In the ideal case, there is also a mutual desire for cooperation – or 
at least for successful communication: if we want to understand what others are saying, 
we must to some extent take their situation into account. In this section I will consider 
how complications such as these are likely to affect the concept of knowledge. 
  One might think that if the purpose of knowledge is to flag approved informants, then 
we should expect the truth conditions relating to knowledge attributions to be highly 
context-dependent with regards to the circumstances surrounding enquiry. These 
circumstances include our purposes for wanting to know, the degree of information we 
already possess that might be relevant, our attitude to risk, and so on. On p.85 Craig 
explains how an inquirer requires an informant that fulfils the following properties (in 
addition to the three already mentioned, apart from I4, which relates to it): 
 
I1: They should be accessible to me here and now 
 
I2: They should be recognisable by me as someone likely to be right about p 
 
I3: Channels of communication between him and me should be open 
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I4: They should be as likely to be right about p as my concerns require (Craig, p85. My 
labelling/reordering) 
 
Clearly, the fulfilment of each of these conditions is relative to details of the particular 
situation in which our inquirer finds himself or herself at the time in question. However, 
life in our primitive community is inherently social: I may find myself in a position to 
recommend a good informant to James, say, because James is himself required to 
recommend a good informant to Susan – and we may then suppose that I have no 
knowledge of the circumstances surrounding Susan’s enquiry. Moreover, many 
knowledge ascriptions take place with no particular purpose in mind; merely forming part 
of the backdrop of common societal knowledge about who is in general a good informant 
about what (clearly we have an inherent curiosity of such things; hence the popularity of 
quiz shows). Therefore, in our analysis we may subject each of these conditions to what 
Craig calls ‘objectivisation’, whereby we abstract away from details of the particular 
circumstances surrounding one individual’s enquiry to arrive at a more substantial and 
intersubjective (but still anthropomorphic) concept. Our individuals living in a linguistic 
community will thus be able to convey information about someone’s status as a potential 
informant in general about whether p concisely and unambiguously, using the single 
locution ‘know’. 
  In this section I will explore how each of the first three conditions becomes de-
relativised: condition I4 will be seen to be of special relevance to the fallibilism versus 
infallibilism debate (although the idea behind it is often expressed using a modal, rather 
than probabilistic vocabulary) with which we are concerned, and will be discussed in 
chapter 4. 
  Let us first consider condition I1. As well as using the concept to flag informants who 
are accessible to me here and now, it will be useful to identify informants that may be 
accessible to me in the near future, or if I am willing to move a short distance. 
Furthermore, an informant may not be accessible to me, but she is accessible to Fred, and 
I can find out what she thinks from Fred. But because pretty much any spatial or temporal 
location a potential informant might find himself or herself is in theory reachable by 
another, it will in fact be more useful for members of our society to apply the concept to 
all informants that otherwise qualify, regardless of whether they are accessible here and 
now. In this case objectivisation proceeds ‘all the way’ – in the fully objectivised concept 
there is no mention of the location of the informant at all. 
  Let us now consider condition I2. Again, another individual in the community might 
recommend an informant to me that, whilst actually suiting my purpose, I would not have 
been able to spot myself. We may likewise extend the scope of our concept to those good 
informants that are (in principle) detectable by some human means. Should we extend it 
any further, or drop the ‘detectability’ condition altogether? Whilst noting the 
verificationist line which ‘warns us, on pain of insignificance, not to let this ‘could be’ 
clause (in ‘could in principle be detectable’) become to strong’, Craig considers the 
possibility of there being correlative properties lying without the scope of actual or even 
possible human capabilities to detect (Craig, p89).  
  Let us approach this question using the three frameworks. Firstly, the descriptive one: as 
humans we cannot systemically designate individuals with properties not detectable by 
human abilities (even as they currently stand), because flagging them as such would be 
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counted as detection of the property. Secondly, there could be no practical advantage to a 
strategy aimed at including them, because again ex hypothesi we cannot detect them. 
Lastly, we cannot rationally decide to look for informants satisfying such a condition, 
given that our search would be futile. Hence unlike I1, if our hypothesis is correct then 
the detectability condition will leave its mark on the concept: good informants must in 
principle be detectable (we will see the importance of this remark in the next chapter). 
This means that the correlative property X must be one which is in principle detectable 
by possible human means, and the concept as we currently operate with it will pertain to 
actual, current human means. Moreover, given the situated nature of the enquiry and the 
derived emphasis on the third-person scenario, we may stand by the claim from section 
2.1 that this property X must be (in principle) detectable by an external subject who 
themselves lack access to the truth about whether p.  
  Lastly, let us consider condition I3: the channels of communication between me and 
another individual may be shut, but they can easily be reopened should I manage to find a 
third person that can act as an interpreter or mediator. Hence I would be unwise to 
exclude a person as a potential informant on this basis alone, and as before we may 
extend the concept to any individual with whom some human specialist may be able to 
communicate. But again, objectivisation does not proceed all the way: recall the first 
reason for only ascribing knowledge to informants rather than sources of information – 
they were convenient to communicate with. A similar analysis would follow from our 
three frameworks.  
 
 
2.7 Proposed Counterexamples 
 
We are now in a position to offer a response to some prima facie counterexamples to the 
claim that the purpose of the concept of knowledge is to flag good informants. Craig 
speaks of two problematic cases in particular: the gangster Luigi, who knows where 
Mario’s body is, but will not say; and those know certain facts but will not be believed 
because they lack credibility: for instance, the boy who cried wolf, or Matilda from 
Hilare Belloc’s ‘Cautionary Tales’. Similarly, a trained spy taken prisoner by a hostile 
nation may be said to know certain government secrets – he has a detectable property that 
indicates he is likely to be right about these sorts of things – whilst being no use as an 
informant, because he will not tell. 
  It seems that in these cases the individuals in question are not good informants, but 
nonetheless are intuitively said to know; and so there is a divergence between the 
intuitive extension of ‘know’ and that which is demarcated by exploring the 
consequences of our hypothesis about the role of the concept. However, objectivisation 
suggests a response to these cases. It seems the problem lies in their failure to meet I3 – 
the channels of communication are shut – but this condition features in a far weaker form 
in the objectivised concept. Hence, Luigi may not tell me where the body is, but perhaps 
he will tell Carlo, and then there is a chance I can find out from him. Likewise, the 
majority of the townsfolk may not believe Matilda, but perhaps someone with a more 
intimate knowledge of her psychology would be able to tell she was not lying on this 
occasion (she will also likely be believed by anyone with less of a connection to her that 
was unaware of her past mistruths). Similarly with our spy; we can always imagine 
contrary pressures which change the playing field in such a way to alter his priorities: 
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perhaps he is given an incentive he cannot refuse; perhaps he changes hands and is 
willing to tell his new captors. Thus we can see why intuitively it would not do to rule out 
these individuals as potentially helpful in our enquiries on principle; they may be the only 
ones who are able to help. 
  Let us now consider some counterexamples to the condition I2. Note that the individuals 
in our previous examples met the unobjectivized version of this condition: the problem 
wasn’t that they were not recognized as having true beliefs on the subject in question, but 
rather with the possibility that they would not convey those beliefs sincerely. Consider 
firstly the ‘secret murderer’: a man who has murdered his wife, managed to make it look 
like an accident, and taken it upon himself not to ever tell anyone or reveal any sign of 
this being the case for as long as he lives. It seems that there is no outward sign that he is 
a good informant about her true cause of death, and yet intuitively one thinks he must 
know that he has killed her. But can both of these things really be true? He might not 
have any property correlative with beliefs about the actual truth that is detectable by the 
people he encounters in his daily life; but perhaps if we avail ourselves of a lie detector it 
might be. Failing that, perhaps in theory we could use complicated neural imaging 
technology to identify neural patterns that indicate that his real beliefs.  
  If he if he is immune to all such tests that humans are in capable of devising, and so 
shows no external or internal marks to indicate his beliefs on the matter are actually the 
correct ones (any part of his behaviour that indicates that he knows might be accidentally 
observed), then it seems more appropriate to surmise that he in fact does not know: 
perhaps he has convinced himself that it was not him that killed his wife, in which case 
he fails the belief requirement. In support of this, we find the view in Dennett (Dennett, 
1989) as well as Fodor (with a precursor in Ryle, 1949) that one cannot really ascertain 
what one believes via introspection, but only through a systematic analysis of one’s 
behaviour. For instance, in Ryle we find the example of an ice skater who claims to 
believe it is safe to venture toward the centre of a frozen lake, but his actual beliefs on the 
matter are exposed by his tendency to ensure himself and his family stay away from it 
when skating (Ryle, 1949). And if beliefs must be supported by corresponding external 
behaviours, then they are always in some sense detectable.  
  Lastly, consider those exceptional human individuals who cannot communicate at all, 
due to complete paralysis, say, but may still be said to know various details about their 
lives (a brain-scan reveals normal activity). If rare counterexamples like this are indeed 
genuine, they are unlikely to bear influence on our conceptual practices (c.f. chapter one: 
the ‘prototypical case’), especially given their inability to participate in normal social life. 
  A more general form of these concerns is what Craig calls the ‘cart before the horse’ 
objection, which points out that a good informant is someone that knows whether p only 
if circumstances concur. Therefore knowledge is the more primitive concept, and being a 
good informant should be analyzed subsequently as knowledge plus some other 
conditions governing this concurrence. Now, although the considerations in this section 
have brought the two notions closer together, we still need not claim that an identity 
holds between being a knower and a good informant for our hypothesis about the role of 
the concept to be correct, or for the Craigean methodology to be a valid and useful one. 
Craig illustrates nicely this with another example: the purpose of a chair is that it is a 
convenient object for individual humans to sit upon. Some chairs (for example, the one 
atop a lit bonfire) do not serve this purpose, despite not losing their claims to chair-hood; 
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but nonetheless an enquiry into the existence of chairs would do well to take this 
hypothesis about the purpose of chairs as its starting point. Likewise for the 
epistemologist: 
 
‘By envisaging such a story we do several things which the proponent of the ‘cart before the horse’ 
objection does not. If we say: ‘Knowledge first, and then comes the capacity to inform’, we leave it 
obscure why the concept of knowledge should ever have arisen, rather as the comparable objection 
about the concept of a chair would leave that concept, and even more so the chairs themselves, 
unaccountable brute-fact bits of the mental and physical habitats.’ (Craig, p. 97) 
 
What objectivisation provides is an explanation for how it can be both true to say that 
the concept of knowledge has its origins in the role it plays in everyday life, and 
further that conditions relating to the concurrence of circumstances that are necessary 
for fulfilling this role appear only in a weakened form; or, in the case of I1, do not 
appear at all. 
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3. Some Varieties of  
Epistemic Infallibilism 
 
 
3.1 Unger and Scepticism 
 
In this chapter, I will describe a number of formulations of epistemic infallibilism, and 
aim to show that each one is too strong to be necessary for knowledge ascriptions. In the 
next chapter I will complete the argument against infallibilism in general by motivating a 
positive fallibilist position about the concept of knowledge. 
  In his 1971 paper ‘A defense of skepticism’, Peter Unger attempts to demonstrate (that 
it is reasonable to believe) the truth of the thesis of scepticism – that all anyone knows is 
at most a very small number of propositions – by showing that there is a condition for 
knowledge (absolute certainty) that is necessary for proper ascription but almost never 
met in real life.  
  He marks a distinction between terms he calls absolute – such as ‘flat’ – and terms that 
are relative, such as ‘bumpy’. Something is only properly called ‘flat’ if it is to no degree 
curved or bumpy, so that ‘flat’ and ‘absolutely flat’ are synonymous, whereas bumpiness 
is a property that may occur in varying degrees. Although absolute terms like ‘flat’ 
appear to admit of qualification – it is natural for one to describe a football pitch as ‘very 
flat’ – these utterances are best paraphrased with constructions like ‘very close to being 
flat’, so the appearance of their having a relative character disappears. Moreover, no such 
paraphrase is available for the relative terms: to say something is very bumpy is by no 
means to say it is ‘close to being [absolutely] bumpy’. He has a variety of other examples 
to illustrate the distinction:  
 
I think that the first term of each of the following pairs is a relative term while the second is an 
absolute one: "wet" and "dry," "crooked" and "straight," "important" and "crucial," "incomplete" 
and "complete," "useful" and "useless," and so on. I think that both "empty" and "full" are absolute 
terms, while "good" and "bad," "rich" and "poor," and "happy" and "unhappy" are all relative terms. 
(p207) 
 
  For practical purposes we often extend usage of absolute terms to other things; even 
though a purported vacuum might not literally be devoid of matter, it is useful to refer to 
it as though it is, if it is empty enough for all practical purposes. However, this is 
dismissed as mere pragmatics: philosophical analysis should aim to capture proper usage 
in the ideal case. It is thus not just knowledge, but whole classes of absolute terms that 
are systematically used incorrectly by being applied when they should not be. 
  It is clear from the pairs of examples above that oftentimes an absolute term can be 
defined in terms of (the total absence of the property corresponding to) a relative term. 
Unger gives such an analysis of the term ‘certainty’: he claims it is the same thing as the 
complete absence of doubt (doubting being a ‘relative’ phenomena, as one can be more 
or less doubtful). His argument for scepticism is then that knowledge requires one to be 
certain of the proposition that one knows, and it is very rarely (if ever) the case that one is 
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absolutely certain with a complete absence of doubt about any given proposition; even 
one as pedestrian as ‘45+56 = 101’.  
  It may seem at first that Unger’s analysis of ‘certainty’ in terms of absence of doubt is 
quite trivially flawed: after all, it is surely intuitively possible to lack completely any 
feeling of doubt over certain propositions that one has not come close to ever 
considering, but it would be a gross misuse of language to say one was certain of them 
(for one thing, we might have a similar attitude of unconsidered indifference to the 
negation of such a proposition). However, this point does not ultimately hurt Unger’s 
position: recall that another necessary condition for knowledge we have derived is that 
the subject believes the proposition in question, which excludes the counterexample cases 
where one is simply indifferent.  
  Unger’s argument for the necessity of certainty as a condition for knowledge ascription 
is linguistic: he claims that sentences of the form ‘I know p, but I am not certain of it’ are 
infelicitous. Let us take this claim to be true; we must then decide whether to understand 
certainty in Unger’s absolute sense, or in a wider, more variable sense that indicates a 
high degree of confidence. The situation seems analogous to that with knowledge: we 
have an intensional intuition (let’s say) regarding what it means for a belief to be certain 
– that it requires complete and total absence of doubt – and also some extensional 
intuitions: in relation to many propositions we have the feeling of certainty as a distinctly 
recognisable mental phenomenon. Certainty in this non-absolute sense is somewhat 
opposed to and undermined by doubt, but in the same way as happiness and sadness are 
antagonistic: the two mental phenomena are mostly likely based on distinct physiological 
processes, which while mutually inhibiting do not require a complete absence of their 
opposite to be properly instantiated.  
  As with knowledge, we may try to resolve this dilemma with the method of 
hypothesizing a role for the concept. And at least within this context, we can see that the 
purpose of the concept of certainty must be to have available to us a way of indicating a 
high degree of confidence in our beliefs. Given this is correct, then the broader sense of 
‘certainty’ suggested by our extensional intuitions lead us to an alternative explanation of 
the linguistic data: the function of self-knowledge ascriptions, we have said, is to 
advocate oneself as a good informant whether p. We have also noted that in order to be of 
any use as an informant, we will in general need to be sufficiently confident of our beliefs 
to induce others to follow them. Now, if we understand ‘certainty’ in the broader sense, 
as merely indicating a high degree of confidence in our beliefs, then we can see why 
these sentences are infelicitous: by admitting we are not certain (in this sense) we are 
suggesting (in contradiction with the first clause of our utterance) that we are in fact not 
good informants. The problem with the sentence, then, is not so much to do with its 
logical truth conditions as that it expresses two contradictory messages. 
  Fortunately I do not think we will have to decide which analysis of ‘certainty’ is correct; 
for even supposing that the absolute analysis is a coherent concept, that doubt as a 
psychical phenomena can be precisely quantified and that there are psychological states S 
could be in which correspond to its complete absence, is it surely quite unreasonable to 
suppose that one has conscious access to this being the case (as opposed to, say, an 
almost complete lack of the absence of doubt) and hence the influence of these kinds of 
states on our actual conceptual practises regarding the term ‘certainty’ will be minimal. 
Our intuitive reaction to statements of the form ‘I know p, but I am not certain of it’ does 
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therefore not count as evidence that knowledge requires this absolute kind of certainty, as 
this intuitive reaction must be a product of certainty in the wider, less precise sense, as 
this is the only kind we ever knowingly encounter.  
  In the remainder of this chapter we will no longer be directly concerned with certainty 
in the psychological sense of this attitude towards one’s beliefs, but rather with the 
manner in which our beliefs come to be, or are guaranteed to be, correct.  
 
 
3.2 The Exclusion Principle  
 
In this section I will discuss what we will call the ‘Exclusion Principle’, which is often 
formulated as follows: if we are to lay claim to knowing that some proposition p is true, 
we must we able to exclude every possibility that is logically incompatible with p. This 
principle has been advocated by David Lewis2, amongst others: 
 
If you are a contented fallibilist, I implore you to be honest, be naive, hear it afresh. ‘He knows, yet 
he has not eliminated all possibilities of error.’ Even if you've numbed your ears, doesn't this overt, 
explicit fallibilism still sound wrong?’ (Lewis, 1996) 
 
The formulation just given introduces an element of internalism: the subject must himself 
or herself be able to exclude these possibilities (whatever this might mean), the active 
tone of which implies they have some awareness that this is the case. Given we have 
argued against the necessity of internalist conditions in the last chapter, we will consider 
instead an externalist version of this idea3: that S’s epistemic situation (to be made more 
precise shortly) must be incompatible with any possibility inconsistent with p – that is to 
say, the truth of p is logically implied by his or her epistemic situation. For example, S 
may satisfy an evidential condition such that it is impossible for him or her to satisfy that 
condition whilst p is false. More generally, in any possible world where S’s epistemic 
situation remains a constant, p is logically required to be true. 
  This idea seems intuitive, but will require clarification. As mentioned, we must make 
more precise what is meant by ‘epistemic situation’: whether this is taken to be 
demarcated by something subjective, such that being in the same epistemic situation as S 
is equivalent to being some entity with the sum total of S’s impressions and 
introspectively accessible thoughts; or, less generally, having S’s subjective mental state 
in that precise instantiation (such that if physicalism is true this would require their neural 
state to be identical); or a function of S’s mental state, S’s specific embodiment in the 
world, and the relationship between them.  
  We will consider what happens if we consider the third possibility later on in this 
chapter (following Williamson and Dretske – see section 3.6); for the moment we will 
assume that one’s epistemic situation can be analyzed internally and then later fused 
together with the factive condition that the subject’s beliefs about p are actually correct. 
                                                
2 As we shall see in the next chapter, Lewis goes on to quality this to ‘relevant’ possibilities – the scope of 
which are contextually determined. 
3 For convenience I will still use the term ‘exclusion principle’ to denote this condition: the possibilities 
being excluded (in the passive sense) by the subject’s epistemic situation, not the subject themselves.  
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In the next section I will argue that the weaker formulation of the exclusion principle – 
that p must logically follow from our psychological state in that precise instantiation – is 
false, and hence the stronger formulation also. In order to do this I will argue that 
oftentimes knowledge that p, where p is some fact about the world around us such as 
‘there are more people living in London than in Cambridge’, does not require one to 
exclude the possibility of the familiar ‘Brains in Vats’ scenario; for it is consistent with 
our internal neurological state that this is the case: there is a possible world in which a 
brain precisely identical to ours in its current state is envatted and fed input giving rise to 
the appearance of it having all the experiences we hope to be having now. 
  Before going on to give this argument, some other comments will be appropriate at this 
juncture. Firstly, we may note that the principle as given includes no counterfactual 
condition; we have said nothing about what S would believe, given that p were in fact 
false. Although this condition is only supposed to be necessary for knowledge, and not 
sufficient, it would be possible for us to avoid the need for unnecessary further conditions 
by translating it into the terms of the account of knowledge presented in this thesis: that 
we may only correctly ascribe knowledge to individuals in possession of some detectable 
property X such that possession of that property logically excludes the possibility of their 
being incorrect whether p. 
  More generally, we have here a further direction in which we can vary the possible 
worlds we are interested in: so far we have been keeping S’s epistemic state fixed and 
varying possible worlds around it, but we could also range over possible worlds where S 
is in a different epistemic state. Presumably S’s existence is contingent, and no-one 
would require that S’s beliefs about p were correct in worlds where p did not exist, but 
we could insist, for example, that S was such that any state S could be in logically implies 
correct beliefs whether p, ranging over all possible world where personal identity held 
between S and the subjects in those worlds. Thus not only must S be in a state logically 
implying p; S must be such that they could not but be in such a state with regards to p. Of 
course, if – as I shall argue – the weaker version as characterised here is false, this 
stronger version must be too – but this kind of counterfactual condition might still play a 
role in the final constructed concept. 
  I will close this section by noting that the line of thought just explored also suggests an 
argument against the exclusion principle as formulated above. I will not pursue this 
argument very far, because I wish to avoid giving a justification for its key assumption, 
as this would take us too far afield into other areas of philosophy. However, I shall briefly 
outline it, both to anticipate the actual argument given in the next section, and to 
consolidate the ideas given so far in this one. Supposing it is true that considerations of 
possible worlds where S does not exist cannot be directly relevant to the question of 
whether S is a good informant whether p, and hence to whether S knows p. If we put this 
thought together with the (well-advocated, but controversial) claim that facts about S’s 
physical embodiment in the world are required to be held constant for personal identity to 
obtain, then we need not consider worlds involving BIV, where there is an alternative 
embodiment for the central subject of impressions (which will not be S). But then it is 
possible that S both knows that p is true whilst their belief that p is incorrect in some of 
these worlds; hence the exclusion principle as formulated is false.  
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3.3 Against the Exclusion Principle 
 
Using the three frameworks of enquiry outlined in the last chapter, I will here claim that 
correct knowledge ascription is possible whilst the exclusion condition (that S’s 
epistemic situation must logically entail p is true) is not met because it is often not 
rational to demand that it is met, the concept will not develop to feature it, and the 
empirical facts of usage suggest we do not in general require it either. 
  The last of these three claims is easily seen to be true: as Unger correctly notes, if the 
exclusion condition was part of the concept of knowledge then we would know very 
little, if anything at all. But this is clearly not how the term is used – ascriptions of 
knowledge about the ‘imminent world’ (see the next paragraph for a definition of this 
term) are common – and so actual usage does not demand we take note of the exclusion 
condition. So let us move on to the question of whether we should expect an organically 
evolved concept of knowledge to include this exclusion principle as one of its conditions.   
  I use the term ‘imminent world’ to refer to the realm of direct experience a subject has 
(following e.g. Valberg, 2007): hence for us the imminent world is currently the everyday 
world around us which most of our beliefs are about, and which contains London, Berlin 
and Australia. For a dreaming person, the imminent world is the dream world; hence a 
subject’s imminent world need not actually exist. If BIV obtained, then, the imminent 
world would not exist and hence almost all of our beliefs would be false. Consequently, 
we would know at most very little.  
  Now, explanation at the strategic level aims to use various branches of science to shed 
light on conceptual practises as the outcome of organic processes. But within the special 
sciences, as well as evolutionary theory, these are processes that happen here in the 
imminent world around us (hence if this world does not exist these theories are false). For 
instance, the theory of evolution by natural selection is a historical theory specifically 
about the occurrence of processes in the imminent world. This given, the practical 
advantage our strategies aim at, explained within these frameworks, will make no 
reference to the possibility of its non-existence: there could, for example, be no 
evolutionary survival value in the ability to exclude the possibility of a BIV scenario, 
because survival value in evolutionary theory is something that is explicitly connected 
with the imminent world around us. Hence analysis at this level suggests that in order to 
know p, where p is some everyday proposition about the imminent world, it is not 
necessary for the subject to exclude the possibility that they are a BIV, and therefore that 
the exclusion principle is false. 
  In make this claim I am not endorsing this and saying we should only care about the 
imminent world: my project is to describe the concept of knowledge as it currently 
stands, and the special sciences and evolutionary theory are important frameworks that 
we can to use in this endeavour. 
  Lastly, let us consider whether it is rational for us to build in the exclusion principle to 
our concept of knowledge, given the purpose that we want it to achieve. Let us again 
(with Craig) take BIV as a representative sceptical possibility, and assume that p is some 
proposition about the imminent world that we have some practical concern in finding out 
about. In the last chapter I argued that we should take as our prototypical ascription 
scenario the case of deciding whether an external subject S is a good informant whether p 
(i.e., a third-person analysis). In order for this question to make sense to us, we must 
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believe that this external subject S exists – which we will generally only come to believe 
if we believe that the external world through which we appear to have access to them 
exists. Moreover, supposing again that p is some question about the imminent world; we 
would ourselves only maintain a practical interest whether p so far as we were convinced 
that this imminent world did in fact exist. Hence the question of whether to ascribe 
knowledge to S, when put in this manner, is set firmly within a context where we are 
ourselves convinced the external world exists, and with the subject S positioned within it.  
  But this being the case, it can be of little interest to us whether or not S can exclude the 
possibility that they are a BIV, because in order to make sense of their testimony, we 
must already be steadfastly convinced they are not. It may often be helpful to us if S 
believes that the external world exists: indeed, by being actively cooperative in their role 
as informant they are in a sense acting as if they believe it to. But there is no reason we 
should demand more than true belief on their behalf when inquirer whether p (where p is 
some practical question). It will therefore be of no concern to an inquirer that a potential 
informant does not possess a convincing proof of the existence of the external world, in 
the style of Descartes’ famous meditations. Given our other interests, then, we are not 
rationally required to insist upon S meeting the exclusion condition: indeed, given the 
difficulty of actually producing a successful refutation of BIV, it would be positively 
detrimental to our practical concerns were we to do so.  
  The most that the infallibilist can demand, then, is that there is a ‘real world’ certainty of 
the subject’s being correct: in Lewisian terms, when p is some proposition about the 
imminent world we have a practical concern with, the range of possible worlds across 
which we require true belief from the subject does not include any of the worlds where 
BIV (and many of the sceptic’s other favourite possibilities) obtain. In Craig’s words:  
 
‘[e]ven when we do set the likelihood [of the subject’s being correct] at 1 that does not mean the 
type of absolute certainty, invulnerability to literally any theoretical possibility, which the sceptic 
characteristically demands and finds us unable to provide. Nothing about our reactions to lotteries or 
the danger of treachery need push us any further that the demand that the actual or ‘real’ chance of 
being wrong should be zero. Hence I suggest, the attractiveness of the idea that someone knows 
whether p when something about him is connected as a matter of natural law with his holding the 
right belief about p.’ 
 
We shall take up this idea of the subject being correct as a matter of natural law in the 
coming sections; for now we merely note that the fact that knowledge ascriptions about a 
wide variety of propositions are possible without the exclusion principle being met is 
enough to assure us that it is not part of the prototypical case, and hence we may leave it 
out of our analysis of the concept of knowledge. 
 
 
3.4 Knowledge and Accidents 
 
In his 1968 paper ‘An Analysis of Factual Knowledge’, Peter Unger advocates the 
following analysis: 
 
‘For any sentential value of p, (at a time t) a man knows that p if and only if (at t) it is 
not at all accidental that the man is right about its being the case that p.’ Unger, 1968, 
p.158 
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Although initially understanding this notion in a way which makes knowledge whether p 
a rather easy condition to meet, Unger later suggested that the problem with his previous 
views was that he interpreted the notion of ‘not at all accidental’ too liberally: ‘My main 
error, then, was not that of giving too vague or liberal a defining condition, but rather that 
of too liberally interpreting a condition which is in fact strict.’ (Unger, 1971, p12.) As we 
shall see in the next section, interpreting it strictly we get another kind of infallibilism, 
and one which it will be fruitful to explore (by considering whether it is necessary for 
knowledge). But how should this ‘accidental’ clause be understood, and what reasons for 
thinking that it is important will our practical explication suggest? Let us address the 
former question first. 
  Unger illustrates a sense in which it is not to be understood: ‘In my analysis of human 
factual knowledge, a complete absence of the accidental is claimed, not regarding the 
existence or abilities of the man who knows, but only as regards a certain relation 
concerning the man and the fact.’ (p.159) Hence one may come to know by accident, of a 
fact that it itself an accident, whilst at the same time it not being to any degree accidental 
that one’s beliefs about this fact were right. In terms of our analysis, we can express this 
by saying that the property X, which indicates reliability whether p, should do so in a way 
that is to no degree accidental. Hence if p is a contingent matter – and in general it will be 
contingent, else we should not be enquiring – the property X should guarantee 
correctness about p whether p comes out true or not, and again counterfactual conditions 
are brought into the analysis. 
  At this point, we can (following Craig, section 6) motivate Unger’s condition in a 
plausible way by connecting it with another feature from the literature: it seems that 
whatever analysis of the third condition is given, one can usually construct (Gettier-style) 
counterexamples such that all three conditions are fulfilled, but the subject’s beliefs are 
only true ‘by accident’, and this undermines our willingness to attribute knowledge to the 
subject. But why is it that the third condition (which, remember, we motivated via a need 
to identify informants with true beliefs) need to ensure that the other conditions are met 
in a specifically non-accidental way? 
  We have said in the last chapter that the property X should be law-like, in order to 
enable an inquirer to tell in advance that there is a high chance of a potential informant’s 
beliefs being correct. However, Gettier-style examples are constructed in such a way that 
some unusual feature is present (or usual feature is absent) which makes the usually 
reliable correlative property X unreliable in that particular instance, whilst at the same 
time it actually does lead the subject to having correct beliefs, but in an entirely 
accidental way. An example will make this clearer. 
  Supposing I am standing outside the door of the UCL seminar room, and through the 
door I can hear the distinctive voice of my favourite professor. I thus come to believe 
(correctly) that the professor is inside the seminar room: however, unbeknownst to me, 
the individuals in the room are actually listening to a recorded debate of some 
philosophical issue, and it just so happens that the voice issuing from the device’s 
speakers was that of my favourite professor.  
  In this example, the connection between hearing the professor’s voice through the door 
and being right about whether they were inside is usually reliable – this may have been 
the first time such an audio device was present in the seminar room. However, in this 
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instance it was entirely an accident that my beliefs were correct (we may suppose he was 
supposed to have caught a flight earlier that day, but it was cancelled due to some other 
accident, so he was able to attend class after all). Why should our practical inquirer 
exclude this kind of informant? Supposing someone had asked me whether the professor 
had been in the room, and later found out that the information he or she had received was 
correct, as well as the other details surrounding how I came to believe this: what reason 
would he or she have to be dissatisfied? Craig suggests: 
 
‘It produces that retrospective feeling of having run a risk, of having done something that one 
would not have done had one just been a little better informed at the time, rather like finding that 
the person who has just driven you 50 miles down a busy motorway without incident hasn’t passed 
the driving test.’ 
 
In one sense, in using me as an informant the inquirer would have been unlucky that the 
correlation did not have its usual connections to the truth about p in this instance. 
However, they would have been in another sense terribly lucky; it was actually not wise 
to use me as an informant on this particular instance, and if they had done so they should 
count themselves very lucky not to end up with a false belief.  
  To a situated inquirer, perhaps observing me listening by the door, things would appear 
normal, and hence they would be inclined to use me as a good informant (and thus end up 
with a true belief). However, when we describe the case from the global perspective we 
are left with the feeling that this would be an unwise move, despite it leading to a true 
belief for the inquirer, because we can see the sense in which it was only accidental that 
my beliefs were correct. It is thus understandable that we should intuitively want to 
withhold knowledge ascription if doing so is tantamount to recommending me as a good 
informant. For we should not want to be in the position of having to rely on such a person 
in these particular (abnormal) circumstances ourselves.  
 
 
3.5 Against Unger’s Non-accidentalism 
 
We can thus see that when we come to analyse the concept of knowledge we will find 
reasons for not wanting our beliefs to be true merely by accident. But does this mean that 
we should require the property X to be connected to the truth about p in a way that is to 
no degree accidental? One (sufficiently non-liberal) reading of this is to require that 
something about the subject is connected to the truth about p as a matter of natural law – 
indeed, if this condition fails, then there must be some contingent fact unconnected with 
X or p that is enforcing the connection in this case. It may seem rather a stretch (if not an 
outright abuse of language) to count any independent contingent feature as an ‘accident’ 
– but there is no absolutist condition that falls short of this; just varying degrees of 
accidentalness. We can imagine a series of intermediate cases: perhaps the class intended 
to listen to the debate on the speaker, but it had blown a fuse, so the professor had to read 
out the transcript instead. The subject being correct by virtue of natural law lies at the 
extreme end of this scale, where his beliefs are to no degree accidental – and anything 
short of this would not be infallibilist in the required sense. 
  If this is the condition, that given the subject’s internal physical state it follows that 
upon any possible embedding of them in a Universe subject to the same physical laws 
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their beliefs would come out true, then I think it is too strong to be necessary for 
knowledge. For one thing, our individuals in the state of nature have no faculty for 
distinguish such cases; as Craig points out (p102/3), the brain’s belief-forming 
mechanisms are highly complex. Rather, given a connection that is in general reliable, 
even though there might be conceivable situations in which this connection could 
systematically fail, and circumstances could conspire to make the individual in question 
wrong whether p, it is still possible for someone to be a good informant (simply) by 
virtue of the corresponding property. As Craig puts it: 
 
‘Gettier cases draw attention to the fact that even very good reasons indeed can let you down; but if 
that be allowed to tell against Smith’s credentials then it tells against everybody else’s. Of course, it 
doesn’t do either. The correlation between having excellent reasons and being right is still what it 
always was: fallible, but virtually unfailing.’ 
 
For example, consider the case where, a week earlier, I had heard the actual voice of my 
professor through the door and no tape recorder was present. Now, this time I think that I 
would have known he was in the room, even though it was actually possible (given my 
epistemic state, understood in an internalist sense) that he was not present and the tape-
recorder scenario obtained. If Unger’s position entails exclusion of this kind of case, then 
this absolutist kind of non-accidentalism seems wrong, because the kind of factor that 
motivated us to withdraw our consent to ascription – i.e. the unusual features of the 
situation that make the correlation accidental in this instance – are absent, even though 
given the property and our epistemic situation it is (in some sense) an ‘accident’ that 
these features were absent. And as noted, there is no obvious absolutist-style cut-off point 
between the usual case of hearing through the door and the deviant case with the 
recorder. 
  When determining whether a subject knows whether p, we usually hold fixed some 
other background features of the situation that are not specified by a description of the 
physical laws. As we shall see in the next section, this practise receives support from 
Dretske, but it can also be motivated from the state of nature account: given there is some 
feature of the world that is public knowledge, ubiquitous but still in some sense 
contingent, we would do well to adopt a strategy aimed at knowledge ascriptions taking 
place with the truth of this feature assumed as a background condition. These background 
assumptions must be widely appreciated by everyone in the community, including the 
subject themselves, of course; they cannot be of a specialized or technical nature, known 
only to the inquirer and a handful of others, or else we cannot properly consider the 
informant as ‘telling us whether p’. To take a modern example of a de facto, in some 
sense accidental, but nevertheless reliable connection, GPS systems may exploit some 
coincidental and arbitrary feature of the cosmos, and yet an individual in possession of 
one may be connected to the truth of his location as a matter of natural law (as well as 
veridical sense perception of the display). 
  In the next chapter we will support these intuitions and somewhat fragmentary ideas 
about Unger’s condition being too strong with a positive argument for a more lenient 
condition, exploring how the non-accidental character of the connection between X and 
the truth of p can be captured in a fallibilist way will generally include (for example) 
putative cases of knowledge such as hearing through a door in the usual case. The 
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remainder of this chapter will focus on the ‘conclusive reasons’ formulation of Fred 
Dretske. 
 
 
3.6 Conclusive Reasons; The Broadness of the Mental 
 
We have seen in section 3 above that entailment from one’s epistemic situation, 
conceived as the sum of one’s subjective experiences, is too strong a condition to be 
necessary for knowledge. Now, picking up a hint from the last section, we will consider 
the position advocated by Fred Dretske. Dretske has claimed that knowledge ascriptions 
imply that the knower possesses ‘conclusive reasons’ – evidence which, in a sense to be 
clarified (together with the relevant sense of ‘possession’), do entail (either logically or 
via the laws of nature) that the proposition in question be true. However, ‘evidence’ and 
other epistemic notions are understood in a broader sense than we have been treating 
them hitherto, and the extension of the concept of knowledge thus demarcated is far 
greater than the meagre allowance typically granted by the sceptic (indeed, we might see 
Dretske’s position as a kind of response to scepticism). 
  In this section, I will sketch out the Dretske line, something similar to which has also 
been advocated by thinkers such as McDowell. Firstly, it will help to introduce some 
terminology, following Williamson’s paper ‘The Broadness of the Mental’ (Williamson, 
1998). Let us begin with the mildly physicalist assumption that, given a particular agent 
S, their total internal (i.e. lying within their physical boundary) and external states (lying 
outside this) determine the total state of the world. Suppose further that we can treat these 
two kinds of states separately (if the physical laws mean that this cannot be done, the 
point follows anyway). A ‘case’ is a temporal slice of a possible world, centred around a 
distinguished subject. A ‘condition’ is something that may fail to obtain in a given case, 
and is specified by a ‘that’ clause – such as ‘the subject is happy’ (which obtains in a 
given case if and only if the centred subject of that case is happy). 
  A case α is ‘internally like’ a case β if and only if their respective subjects have 
identical internal physical states, and a condition is ‘narrow’ if and only if it obtains in α 
whenever α is internally like some other state β where it obtains (it only depends on the 
internal). Conditions not meeting this requirement are ‘broad’. Many conditions relating 
to mental phenomena are broad: for example, seeing Naples is broad because someone 
internally like someone who was seeing Naples is not therefore seeing Naples 
themselves; they could be subject to an illusion, for example (Williamson, 1998, p390). 
Conditions relating to external states in the same way that narrow clauses relate to 
internal states are called ‘environmental’. A condition is ‘composite’ if and only if it may 
be expressed as the conjunction of a narrow condition and an environmental condition, 
and ‘prime’ otherwise. 
  So far it may sound as if we have been treating knowledge as if it were a composite 
condition that can be decomposed into the factive condition plus some manifest 
properties of the observer. But consider the following kind of argument, which shows 
that knowledge is in fact often governed by prime conditions. 
  To show that a condition is prime, it will do to provide cases α and β such that the 
condition obtains in both, but does not obtain in a case γ which is specified to be 
internally like α and externally like β. 
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  Let α be a case in which one knows by testimony that an election was rigged. We are 
told this by Smith, who we trust. Brown also tells us the election was rigged, but he is not 
trustworthy and we do not trust him. Conversely, let β be a case in which both Smith and 
Brown tell us, but this time it is Brown that is trusted and trustworthy, whereas Smith is 
distrusted and untrustworthy. Now consider the case γ, which is internally like α and 
externally like β. In this case no informant is both trusted and trustworthy, hence we do 
not know that the election was rigged. Hence the condition that we know about the 
election is prime, and it is clear that examples with this structure can be constructed to 
say the same thing about pretty much any kind of knowledge that relates to the external 
world (Williams presents similar arguments for other mental predicates such as ‘seeing’ 
and ‘believing’). 
  In his paper ‘conclusive reasons’, Fred Dretske claims that a necessary and sufficient 
condition for knowledge is possession of ‘conclusive reasons’. Reasons R are conclusive 
for p if and only if given R, ¬ <> ¬ p  (where <> expresses some hitherto unclarified 
modal operator). Alternatively, we can formulate this as ‘given R, <> (R & ¬p)’. This 
means that condition 2. below is entailed by condition 1.: 
 
1. S knows that P and he knows this on the basis (simply) of R 
 
2. R would not be the case unless P were the case.  
 
A person has conclusive reasons, R, for believing P if and only if: 
 
(A) R is a conclusive reason for P (i.e. (2) is true), 
 
(B) S believes, without doubt, reservation, or question, that P is the case and he believes this 
on the basis of R, 
 
(C) (i) S knows that R is the case or 
(ii) R is some experiential state of S (about which it may not make sense to suppose that S 
knows that R is the case; at least it no longer makes much sense to ask how he knows). 
(Dretske, 1971, p12/13) 
 
The definition is saved from circularity ((C)(i) contains a reference to knowledge) 
because recursive application will eventually reduce knowledge ascriptions to conditions 
of the type (C)(ii).  
  Now, the Dretske line is immune from the arguments for infallibilism presented above 
on several counts. Firstly, the modal operator <> does not denote logical entailment of P 
from R, or even entailment via the laws of nature, but entailment (either logically or 
nomically) only relative to a particular set of circumstances. Dretske explains: 
 
‘If someone remarks, mid-way through a poker hand, that if his neighbour had not folded (dropped 
from the game) he (the speaker) would have been dealt a royal flush … He is not saying that his 
neighbour’s remaining in the game is, quite generally, sufficient for his receipt of a royal flush. 
Rather, he is saying that in the particular circumstances which in fact prevailed on this occasion, 
circumstances which include such things as card distribution, arrangement of players, etc., an 
occurrence of the first sort (neighbour remains in game) will invariably be followed by one of the 
second sort (he receipt of a royal flush). 
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Likewise, in general when we consider claims to knowledge we are to hold fixed those 
circumstances that are causally and logically independent of P and R, and see if it is 
possible for P to be true whilst S has reasons R (and there is some resemblance here to 
our interpretation of Unger’s position). 
  Secondly, as mentioned above, the notion of evidence is understood more broadly (in 
Williamson’s sense) than we have been considering hitherto. Consider an individual 
sitting outside in their garden, and seeing a robin perched on the fence. Given that they 
see it, is it possible that the robin is not actually there? As the sceptic is fond of pointing 
out, there are possible worlds in which there are individuals having the same subjective 
experiences as this person, whilst the robin is not really there at all (they are being 
somehow systematically mislead about this sort of thing). However, if the conditions 
governing notions of seeing are characteristically prime – and Williamson argues 
convincingly that they are – then the individual in question is not seeing the robin in these 
cases either (this is essentially the disjunctivist line). Likewise, neurological twins are not 
necessarily in the same epistemic situations, because evidential relations are prime. For 
example, a BIV with an identical brain to yours is not in the same epistemic situation. 
  On this understand of epistemic notions, then, the sceptical challenge does not show that 
the evidence is inconclusive, because in the sceptical worlds where P is not true the 
subject does not possess R. The sceptical challenge only undermines the question of 
whether we know that we know: usually veridical experiences are all that is required for 
knowledge itself. Therefore, if most of our experiences are veridical, and we should like 
to hope that this is the case, entering into the knowledge relation is an everyday, 
commonplace occurrence. In the next section I will discuss how the Dretske position thus 
outlined ties together with Craig’s project. 
 
 
3.7 The Craigean Response 
 
I have said that conditions imposed on knowledge ascriptions by Dretske allow the 
concept to have a much wider extension than that typically granted by the sceptic; indeed, 
perhaps even something close to the actual usage of the term ‘knowledge’ from the 
descriptive framework (which, on our approach, will have to play a large role in 
determining what counts as an adequate analysis). Because it does not define knowledge 
into being something exceptional and rarely attained, and leaves room for knowledge as a 
phenomenon that actually plays an important role in everyday human life from its most 
primitive forms, the Dretske position is not infallibilist in the sense that this thesis aims to 
refute. However, prima facie it seems that there are at least two places where Craig and 
Dretske’s analysis diverge. The first is that our earlier insistence on the informant having 
a detectable property does not seem to fit harmoniously with the idea that epistemic 
notions such as evidence are prime, so that whether or not they are instantiated is 
indeterminate given only the internal state of the possessor (whereas one might prima 
facie think a detectable property should have to be determinate in this respect). A second, 
related difference is that we have said that this property should be detectable to 
individuals who do not themselves have access to the truth whether p – which seems to 
imply that it should be independent of the truth about p – whereas according to Dretske’s 
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views, whether or not someone has ‘conclusive reasons’ depends on whether or not their 
experiences are veridical (and in order to ascertain this, given only a report of their 
subjective impressions, we might need to have access to the truth about p ourselves). The 
remainder of this chapter will aim to show that, although the two positions do diverge, 
the contrast is not as radical as may be thought at first sight. 
  As I have mentioned, the fact that the property X (which indicates being a reliable 
informant about p) needs to be (at least in principle) detectable seems to imply that on the 
Craigean account the third condition for knowledge is narrow (in Williamson’s sense; see 
section 3.6, above). However, this inference would be overly hasty. Recall that our 
analysis is proceeding from the situated viewpoint, with informant and inquirer standing 
in some specific spatio-temporal relation to one another, rather than the inquirer reading, 
say, a printout detailing the potential informant’s internal physical constitution. The 
relevant sense of ‘detectable’ is therefore one that naturally brings in its train certain 
implications about the physical embodiment of the informant with relation to the inquirer. 
A typical example might proceed as follows: 
 
Mrs. Jones, sitting in the living room, sees Mr. Jones staring out of the kitchen window. After a 
brief exchange in which it emerges he is staring at the moon, Mrs. Jones asks her husband if the 
moon is full that night. Now, the detectable property that suggests he is likely to be right about this 
question is not that he is internally constituted in a certain way, so as to give rise to certain 
subjective experiences, but rather, it is specifically that he is staring out of the window at the moon. 
This can be directly observed by Mrs. Jones, who can also see that he is not hooked up to any 
elaborate visual device designed to deceive him, and can thus infer that his experiences are veridical 
and (given that channels of communication are properly open – i.e., there is no question of 
deliberate deception) his reports accurate. 
 
  More generally, what will often occur in the prototypical case is that when the property 
suggesting an informant to be reliable is detectable, the means by which it is detected 
(prior to a knowledge ascription) will also be such as to suggest that the property is in 
fact coupled to the environment in such as way as to make the experiences of the subject 
(the potential informant) veridical. Moreover, in judging whether their beliefs are likely 
to be true, we only rely on evidence presented by an informant insofar as we believe it to 
represent veridical experience. 
  It is true that narrow conditions must feature as the basis for any strategy we ascribe to 
the inquirer – indeed, we can understand a strategy as a conditional response to how 
things seem; the strategy is in general only working effectively when these ‘seemings’ 
are veridical, but this condition does not feature as part of the strategy itself. However, 
this consideration applies only to the inquirer, whereas the informant – the prospective 
knower – will usually be an external person. This given, there is no reason to think 
conditions governing ascription of the detectable property X to be composite; indeed, if 
Dretske’s arguments for prime epistemic notions connecting better with action are valid, 
this is the opposite of what we should expect. Consideration of the state of nature thus 
provides good reasons to think the evidential notions are prime. And if we do understand 
both the property X itself and ‘detection’ as concepts that are characteristically prime, the 
divergence between the two accounts is greatly reduced.  
  Moreover, on this understanding of ‘detectability’, the second reason for which the two 
accounts may be thought to diverge is also softened: understanding the property X as 
something that is only instantiated if the experiences or reasons the subject has which 
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connect it to the truth about p are veridical, detection of the property X (which must be in 
some sense possible, remember) does suggest the informant is likely to be right about p, 
and this can be done from the inquirer’s position of not knowing about p themselves. 
Detection thus only occurs if the property X is actually instantiated, which requires it 
actually having the appropriate connections with the surrounding environment. And an 
inquirer can see this to be the case without knowing whether p themselves. 
  Lastly, although it is not infallibilist in a way that would obviously conflict with the 
picture of knowledge as I have constructed it so far (as opposed to, say, a concept 
involving the exclusion principle), Dretske’s position still has something of an absolute 
character: knowledge requires reasons that provide logical or empirical entailment 
(holding fixed circumstances independent of those reasons and of p) of the truth of p. Or, 
under the terms of our account, the property X should be such as to guarantee (under the 
appropriate modal idiom) that the informant’s beliefs whether p are correct, given the 
background conditions remain the same. Can we accept this? 
  Firstly, prior to considerations brought in by objectivisation, the inquirer cannot be 
interested in holding fixed all circumstances independent of R and p, but only the features 
of those circumstances which he himself is aware of. In the next chapter, we will see 
what happens to this reservation as objectivisation proceeds. Secondly, as with the above 
interpretation of Unger’s non-accidentalism, I believe the absolute character of the 
formulation means that it is indeed too strong a condition to characterize what it means to 
be a good informant. To see why this is the case, we must return in the next chapter to the 
situation of the practical inquirer, to see just how demanding a typical inquirer will be. 
This is the subject of the next chapter, in which the argument against infallibilism about 
knowledge will be completed. 
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4. Interest-Relative  
Contextualism 
 
 
4.1 Fallibilism and Practical Interests 
 
Let us recap over the situation. Our practical inquirer finds himself situated in the world, 
and seeks to find out whether some proposition p is true – for the most part, in order to 
gain some practical advantage in the world. Moreover, there are a range of things he 
takes himself to know about the world, and a (much larger) range of facts about the world 
that he does not know. Consequently, his epistemic situation (understood in the narrow, 
internalist sense) will mark out a range of ‘open possible worlds’ that he could be in, 
given that his experience is a certain way. Any property X that is a serious candidate for 
correlating well with being reliable about p will show the informant to be right in their 
beliefs about p across a wide range of these possible worlds. Moreover, in a particular 
case, when the inquirer discerns that a potential informant is in possession of such a 
property, this will also determine an epistemic probability (from the point of view of the 
inquirer) that the potential informant’s beliefs about p are correct. Which of these two 
formulations is the most fundamental – and how demanding is our inquirer to be here?  
  According to the infallibilist, the answer to the later question is that the inquirer should 
be in some sense maximally demanding – so that, given the property, the truth of the 
subject’s beliefs is entailed (either logically or nomically) to be correct. This given, there 
is no difference between the modal and epistemic formulations – if we know someone is 
right in all the possible worlds that might be the actual world, then our epistemic 
probability of their being right is 1 (and conversely).4 However, as we have seen, when 
we take the purpose of the concept of knowledge as determining its core features, and not 
a side-issue merely relating to pragmatics, we see that the infallibilist’s demands will not 
in general be met: for one thing, there are some possible worlds consistent with the 
inquirer’s experience that will be paid no attention (such as worlds where BIV and other 
radical sceptical scenarios obtain). Moreover, to express things probabilistically, I will 
argue below that it will only rarely be the case that when seeking an informant for some 
practical issue one will only settle for one that is likely to be correct with (epistemic) 
probability 1.  
  Given that the two notions come apart, then – to say something holds in a wide range of 
open possible worlds is by no means to say it is (epistemically) likely – I will suggest that 
either a modal or a probabilistic deficiency in an individuals credentials is enough to 
undermine their prospective claims to knowledge whether p (as we shall see in section 
4.5 below, this echoes a suggestion of Jason Stanley – Stanley, 2005). In the previous 
chapter, we saw how the third person nature of our enquiry and the consequent set-up of 
the prototypical case meant that for some kinds of questions (i.e., practical questions 
about the imminent world) some open possible worlds (e.g., BIV worlds) were likely to 
                                                
4 Mathematicians distinguish between ‘certain’ and ‘with probability 1’, with the former entailing the latter 
but not conversely. However, for our purposes this distinction may be safely ignored.  
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always be excluded from consideration in determining when our anthropomorphisized 
concept of knowledge was applicable. Later in this chapter I will explore precisely which 
sets of possible worlds an inquirer may exclude; in the remainder of this section I will 
explore how epistemic probabilities less than 1 might come to be acceptable.  
  If I am enquiring for my own purposes, I will attach a certain level of importance to 
gaining correct beliefs whether p. The possibility that an informant might be wrong is 
weighed against various other facts, such that any belief about p might be better than no 
belief: the real world has its own time pressures, and sometimes even an action based on 
incorrect evidence is better than no action at all. Moreover, there may be some negative 
consequence to not coming to know whether p. For instance, suppose I wish to know 
whether a given tree has bananas at the top of it; I cannot tell from the ground, but I am 
aware that Peter climbed the tree the other day (a property that makes him reliable on the 
question at hand, but not infallible; someone may have interfered with the tree since). My 
practical interest in acquiring bananas to eat, the amount of effort that I will need to 
expend climbing the tree, the opportunity costs waived in embarking on this adventure, 
and my attitude to risk all contribute to determining some minimal level of epistemic 
probability that must be met in order for it to be rational (or strategically prudent) for me 
to follow the information given to me by Peter. Unless I am maximally risk-averse – and 
there is no reason to suppose individuals in the state of nature would be like this; in fact, 
everything we have said so far seems to speak against it – then this probability will 
usually be less than 1. 
  In the general case, whenever I am enquiring for my own purposes, I will take all of the 
practical facts of this nature (of which I am aware) into account and adopt a threshold of 
‘likeliness to be correct’ that must be met in order for an informant to count as acceptable 
to me – that is to say, I will only ask informants who appear to possess some property X 
which suggests that they are (epistemically) at least this likely to be correct on the matter 
in question. This is Craig’s condition I4 that we met in chapter 2. However, as was also 
made clear in chapter 2, we have thus far considered only a simplified version of things: 
knowledge ascriptions are not made in isolation, but in general in our linguistic 
community they will be made publicly, and hence have certain repercussions. Likewise, 
sometimes I may want to recommend an informant to Fred, without having any idea what 
Fred’s purposes are in wanting to know – so, one might think, I had better make sure that 
I recommend someone that is sufficiently likely to be correct whatever Fred’s purposes 
might be (i.e. correct with probability 1). However, if this is our strategy we are likely to 
find ourselves usually depriving others of access to informants that are in fact perfectly 
sufficient to their needs. 
  Later in this chapter (section 4.4) we will explore more fully the effects that these kinds 
of contrary pressures objectivisation leads to will have on the threshold of probability 
necessary for knowledge; meanwhile, in the next two sections we return to the modal 
aspect of the debate. In the next section we will look to the literature for an attempt to 
capture the sets of open possible worlds that are salient to knowledge ascriptions: the 
contextualism of David Lewis (Lewis, 1996). 
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4.2 Lewisian Contextualism 
 
We saw in the last chapter that the infallibilist’s formulations of the concept of 
knowledge tend to involve modal conditions that are too strong, and hence looser 
conditions are necessary. But how is this ‘looseness’ to be expressed, exactly? Roughly 
speaking, what is required is to demarcate some non-exhaustive subset of possible worlds 
such that it is necessary for knowledge that the detectable property X ensures an 
informant is correct across all of them (or, alternatively, some larger subset such that the 
informant is correct across most of them – including the actual world). Let us try out a 
proposal of this sort by looking at a recent attempt to introduce some flexibility into the 
concept of knowledge: the contextualism of David Lewis. An utterance is context-
sensitive if it expresses different propositions in different contexts of use; contextualism 
is the thesis that knowledge ascriptions are context-dependent in ‘a distinctly 
epistemological way’ (Stanley, 2005). This means that in different contexts of use, 
different evidential standards are called into play. Lewis’s proposal is that: 
 
S knows that P iff S's evidence eliminates every possibility in which not-P - Psst! - except for 
those possibilities that we are properly ignoring. (Lewis, 1996, p554) 
 
Again, adapting the proposal to our overall account of knowledge, we may understand 
this as a proposed necessary condition on the property X – that possession of it excludes 
every possibility in which the subject is incorrect about p, except those we are ‘properly 
ignoring’. Moreover, Lewis supplies a list for conditions for when we are and are not 
properly ignoring a given possibility. Briefly, these are: 
 
The rule of Actuality 
The possibility that actually obtains (i.e. the possible world we are in) is never properly ignored.  
 
The rule of Belief 
A possibility that S believes to obtain is never properly ignored.  
 
The rule of Resemblance 
Supposing two possibilities saliently resembling each other; then if one may not be properly 
ignored (other than in virtue of this rule), then neither may the other. For example, the possibility 
that you win the lottery saliently resembles the actualized possibility in which you do not, and so 
cannot be properly ignored. 
 
The rule of Reliability 
Where we obtain knowledge by a route that is in general reliable (such as visually), the possibility 
that this mechanism has suddenly failed us on this occasion may properly be ignored. 
 
The Two rules of Method 
We are entitled to presuppose that a sample is representative, and that the ‘best’ explanation of 
our evidence is correct. 
 
The rule of Conservatism 
Possibilities which are usually ignored by others around us may be ignored. 
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The rule of Attention 
A possibility that is not actually ignored [i.e. to which our attention is directed] is not properly 
ignored. 
 
Lewis later asserts that there is no reason to expect there to be a purpose that the concept 
of knowledge thus demarcated is suited to fulfilling: ‘What is it all for? Why have a 
notion of knowledge that works in the way I described? (Not a compulsory question. 
Enough to observe that we do have it.)’ (Lewis, 1996, p 563). Of course, given the kind 
of project I have embarked upon, I should have to respectfully disagree here. He goes on 
to say: ‘if you doubt that the word ‘know’ bears any real load in science or in 
metaphysics, I partly agree.’ Indeed, if knowledge is characterized in this way, it 
becomes hard to see any role for it, primarily because the rule of attention. This rule 
implies that, should an individual consider whether they have hands (for example) whilst 
bearing in mind the possibility of being deceived by a Cartesian demon, then they do not 
know whether they have hands. But if they are not considering such a possibility, then 
they do know (Lewis wants to say). However, as long as a potential informant meets the 
other conditions laid down for knowledge in this thesis, it should be of no concern to an 
inquirer whether the subject is consciously turning over this possibility or not; the 
property of being a good informant is more substantial than that. The fact that they are 
merely considering such a possibility does nothing to undermine their claims to 
knowledge (so long as they do not take it so seriously that they become distracted and 
thus unable to properly tell us anything).  
  On the other hand, at least some of the other rules may plausibly be thought to have 
motivations from the state of nature perspective. Consider, for example, the rule of 
conservatism; if everyone ignores a possibility it is unlikely to feature in our constructed 
concept as actually operated with when analysed from the descriptive or strategic 
frameworks. Moreover, given also that such possibilities are actually false, it might be 
rational to ignore them too, especially if not doing so excludes large classes of informants 
on this basis alone (potential informants may not bother ensuring that their beliefs would 
be correct in worlds they are sure are not the actual world). Likewise, the ‘rule of 
actuality’ reiterates the factive condition of knowledge, and the ‘rule of belief’ will 
usually be met wherever we can properly regard a subject S as (truthfully) ‘telling us 
whether p’, given that people in general try to avoid holding contradictory beliefs. The 
rule of reliability has an analogue with the discussion from chapter 3 whereby a reliable 
connection between X and having true beliefs whether p is (given the other conditions are 
met) sufficient for knowledge, even though there are conceivable circumstances where 
this connection could fail. And as the rule of resemblance seems intuitively plausible, 
perhaps we can find a place for this too (the inquirer may not know which of these 
alternatives bearing close resemblance to each other are actualized).  
  In general, if our hypothesis is correct, then if there are respects in which knowledge is 
context-sensitive, they must have something to do with the context-relativeness of being 
a suitable person to use as an informant as to whether p. These in turn will tend to relate 
to either the general circumstances surrounding enquiry in our primitive society, or to the 
practical interests of the inquirer. In seeing where Lewis’s conditions diverge from these 
criteria – chiefly with the rule of attention – we can see where his analysis appears – from 
the Craigean perspective – to have gone wrong; moreover, considering where he seems to 
have got it right will help steer us in the right direction. 
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4.3 Possible Worlds and Objectivisation  
 
Let us recap over the simplest case of knowledge ascription. In the prototypical scenario, 
an inquirer will flag an external individual as a good informant, based on some detectable 
property X that suggests they will be correct in asserting whether p (where p is some 
practical, everyday matter) across some range of possible worlds that the inquirer 
considers, for these purposes, to be open. The sense of ‘consider’ here means to take into 
account in his or her practical actions; this is not Lewis’s ‘rule of attention’: there are, 
more or less, a fixed set of possibilities we ignore when applying the concept of 
knowledge in everyday situations, and these generally include the favourite possibilities 
of the sceptic. Some of these possible worlds, such as where the inquirer is a BIV, are 
excluded by the terms of the enquiry. Moreover, the third-person nature of the ascription 
means the inquirer will not consider some worlds that are consistent with how things 
seem to the potential informant – such as worlds where the potential informant is a BIV. 
If this individual is correct across the possible worlds considered, including the actual 
world, we may say that they are a suitable informant for this inquirer to use, and hence 
appropriate subjects for knowledge ascription according to our hypothesis. 
  Now, for conditions I1 – I3, the effect of objectivisation of our constructed concept was 
to take us from relativised conditions that depended on the situation of the inquirer, to 
more substantial, intersubjective conditions. The thought here is that perhaps the same 
process will take us from this range of open possible worlds that depend on the inquirer’s 
situation, to a more general condition simply referring to possible worlds centred around 
the informant that are close to the actual world – hence ending up at an account with 
modal aspects somewhat similar to that of Robert Nozick (Nozick, 1981).  
  Consider two inquirers in different epistemic situations, each considering whether to use 
an individual as an informant. Each brings something different to the table; the range of 
possible worlds they consider to be open will be different (but overlapping), and they will 
have varying degrees of information about the informant herself (indeed, it might be a 
completely different property X that each is using to identify them). We may leave the 
second kind of consideration aside, because this is information that inquirers can easily 
and swiftly compare (i.e., we may consider what would happen if everyone had first 
shared all of the information of this nature). With condition I2, the detectability 
requirement, the effect of objectivisation was to approve knowledge ascriptions across 
the union of the set of informants recognizable to each observer; we thus abstracted away 
from the detection capacities of particular individuals to a non-relativized, general notion 
of detectability. What is the equivalent process of combination for condition I4? 
  Firstly, if everyone in the society does not take seriously the possibility that some 
particular class of possible worlds obtains, then this class of possible worlds will not be 
considered when evaluating good informants (c.f. Lewis’s ‘Rule of Conservatism’). In 
other words, knowledge ascriptions occur against a fixed backdrop of ‘common 
knowledge’ within the society. Hence, it will be permissible for knowledge-ascriptions 
relating to informants that are correct across the union of open possible worlds of every 
competent observer in the society (or in some restricted sense, every possible observer) to 
enter into public circulation. Should we stop here? 
  Supposing I were to recommend an individual as a good informant on some particular 
question, because I can tell he is correct in all of the possible worlds I seriously consider 
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to be open. Should it concern me that the person to whom I am recommending considers 
other possible worlds to be open; worlds where the informant might not be correct? 
Again, we have two contrary pressures; on the one hand, no; I can in good conscience 
recommend this person, and allow this recommendation to become commonly believed, 
because I firmly believe that the informant’s beliefs on the matter in hand will be correct. 
It is true that if another inquirer seriously considers some possible world to be a 
possibility, then if the potential informant will not be correct in that world, the inquirer 
will not think he is a good informant. But from my point of view, this might be diagnosed 
as a case where, due to his limited perspective on the situation and what possible worlds 
might be actualized, this other inquirer is simply wrong. On the other hand, however, I 
would also like these recommendations to be believed: firstly due to the altruistic motive 
of wanting to enable others to make use of them, and secondly because presumably it is 
in my interests not to acquire a reputation for being inept at recommending informants 
(this second desire might be partly motivated by the first), or to suffer reproach for 
recommending someone inappropriate.  
  It seems the situation here is like this: we can imagine two inquirers, each having a 
different set of open possible worlds, and we are interested in which set is the correct one 
to consider for knowledge ascriptions. Now, it is likely that there is no objective answer 
here: only one world is really open, given all available information, and that is the actual 
world. But if we restrict consideration to this world alone, we should be left with no 
modal condition at all – and we will have clearly missed the point somewhere. 
  Perhaps it would be better to describe the situation like this: there are general 
background assumptions that people in our primitive society share, and only possible 
worlds where these assumptions hold true are relevant to knowledge ascriptions (these 
worlds are thus in some sense ‘close’, although not expressly understood by inquirers as 
centred around the actual world, for they do not know which of these open possible 
worlds this actual world is). However, these assumptions are neither static nor overly 
determinate and explicit: given that we might be in a privileged epistemic position with 
regard to what possible worlds might actually be the real world, we can also make 
recommendations to others. If a recommendation is sufficient to persuade the person to 
whom we are recommending that the open (from their perspective) possible worlds in 
which the subject are wrong are in fact not candidates for actuality, the recommendation 
will be successful, and it will be in our interests to make it. If not, we always have the 
option of simply asserting that we believe their beliefs on the matter in question will be 
true – possibly supplemented with some kind of explanation as to why. Moreover, if the 
extra information we supply in excluding some of the worlds in which the potential 
informant would be wrong is overly specialized, detailed or technical, we then cease to be 
able to regard this potential informant as someone who is properly able to ‘tell us whether 
p’. 
 
 
4.4 Objectivisation and Probability 
 
Let us now return to the probabilistic aspect of the debate. We have said (pre-
objectivisation) that our inquirer seeks an informant who is ‘likely enough to be correct 
for his [the inquirer’s] purposes’: if the question is one such that even an answer with a 
good chance of being wrong is better than no answer at all – perhaps we are subject to 
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some penalty if we do not act, such as starvation – then we may be rather more lax in our 
standards for considering someone a good informant. However, if our purposes in 
wanting to know are very important indeed, we will tend to be much more discriminating 
when we come to decide whom we are willing to trust. This given, in the simple, 
individual case it seems that the probability threshold required – the minimum epistemic 
probability with which the detectable property X must predict a correct answer about p – 
will be relativised to the inquirer’s concerns. In the next section we will consider 
(Stanley’s) objections to the claim that knowledge is context-dependent in this way; in 
this section we will consider what happens to this condition as objectivisation proceeds. 
  As previously noted, I may often find myself in a position to recommend, perhaps via a 
mediator, informants to an inquirer, whilst having no information about what that 
inquirer’s purpose is in wanting to know (other than what is suggested by the nature of 
the question). This given, there is something of a ‘pull towards certainty’ (in Craig’s 
words) here – perhaps I should do well to only recommend informants who are likely 
enough to be correct to meet any practical purpose this informant might conceivably 
have. The same is true if knowledge ascriptions are made with no particular purpose in 
mind, but simply to add to the general cumulative store of information that is shared 
amongst the community: we do not know the purpose for which they will be used. 
  We may supplement the thought that there is something of a pull towards demanding 
increasingly competent informants in our ascriptions of knowledge with a notion 
frequently discussed in the literature: that of a lottery. Whilst certainly not an 
uncontroversial feature of the human condition, it is plausible that lotteries and other 
forms of betting at quantified rates are widespread enough to bear influence on current 
everyday conceptual practice in the world of today (we can thus consider this an 
extension of the state of nature method). What the lottery example provides is an 
everyday situation in which an inquirer’s needs may be made arbitrarily demanding: if a 
lottery has n tickets, then the testimony of an informant who claims – with probability 
less than n-1/n of being right – that the inquirer will lose if he buys a ticket may find that 
his testimony is ignored if the lottery’s jackpot is sufficiently high.  
  Given that there are common situations where an inquirer may become arbitrarily 
demanding, then, as well as that oftentimes we will not know in advance what purpose a 
knowledge ascription may be used for, we might think that objectivisation will leads to a 
situation where the concept of knowledge is only correctly applied to informants who are 
certain to be correct. However, this line of thought is too quick: it assumes that the best 
conceptual strategy would aim at never being wrong. By setting our threshold at certainty 
we would achieve this goal, but in insisting upon this condition we also exclude from 
proper usage vast numbers of cases where a particular informant is perfectly suitable for 
the purposes an inquirer might have (bearing in mind specifically the case where this is 
so but not known to us). Our withholdings of knowledge have social consequences: in 
doing so we are suggesting to others that they do not act on this information; that they do 
not treat certain individuals as good informants. And when there is clear benefit in them 
treating them as good informants – the informant was in fact sufficiently likely to be 
correct, given their purposes in wanting to know, as well as factively correct – it seems 
we will have spoken incorrectly, given our assertion of the primacy of the role of the 
concept. This would therefore be a poor strategy for a community to adopt.  
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  Moreover, there is also the possibility of error on our part – given the unpredictability of 
real-world conditions and the imperfections inherent in (for example) our sensory 
apparatuses, it does not make strategic sense to be this demanding. A potential informant 
will rarely, if ever, possess a property that makes him likely to be correct with probability 
1 – and even if this is the case it will be nigh on impossible for us to identify that they do 
(as opposed to falling just short of the mark, say). This given, considerations such as the 
theoretical possibility of arbitrarily demanding inquirers will most likely bear little 
influence on conceptual practice. The pull towards certainty is offset by conflicting 
considerations (again, it is only because of the existence of contrary pressures that there 
is any controversy here at all).  
  What I suggest instead, then, is that there will be in operation a general level of 
probabilistic stringency for knowledge ascriptions (when one is blind to the purpose the 
recommendation will be used for) that will emerge from the balancing of the two sets of 
opposing forces – the pull towards certainty, and the pursuit of practical advantage. 
Moreover, rather than considering the epistemic probability for different inquirers, we 
can abstract to the conditional probability linking possession of the property X to being 
right about p (if there is more than one such property, as in general there will be, we 
consider the one corresponding to the highest conditional probability). 
  If a subject is suitable for a given inquirer but does not meet this general threshold level, 
it should not enter into common parlance that the subject ‘knows’ (we can always fall 
back on other expressions such as ‘it’s almost as if they knew’ – c.f. Craig, p98). 
However, even if an informant does meet the general stringency requirement, we should 
not rely on them if our specific requirements are more demanding, and likewise we 
should try not to recommend them to others if we are aware of their purposes in wanting 
to know and can see that this particular individual will fall short of their expectations. 
Similarly, given that this general level of stringency falls short of absolute certainty, 
someone with a particularly important and pressing reason for wanting to get the right 
belief on a given question is unlikely to rely on the general public opinion that a given 
individual does know the right answer (which doesn’t undermine the fact that this general 
opinion serves an important purpose). 
  Are these extra considerations relating to specific purposes merely pragmatics, or are 
they part of the core of the concept? We will take up a related linguistic question in 
section 4.6, below; for now we will continue to investigate proper conceptual practice, 
taking the role of the concept as primary. And as this condition has a clear justification 
from consideration of our hypothesis about this role, we may consider it as part of the 
core of the concept (where it applies). Hence, we should expect that knowledge 
ascriptions are often relativised to an inquirer’s concerns: to ascribe knowledge to 
someone, they must both meet the general level of stringency, as well as being likely 
enough to be correct for whoever’s purposes we have in mind when making the 
ascription (in those cases where we do have some such individual in mind at all). 
 
 
4.5 Stanley’s Interest-Relative Invariantism 
 
The concept of knowledge as we have constructed it from our hypothesis bears some 
relation to another formulation found in the literature: that given by Jason Stanley in 
‘Knowledge and Practical Interests’ (Stanley, 2006). They are similar in the sense that 
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both take the ‘practical facts’ – understood as ‘the costs of being right or wrong about 
one’s beliefs’ – into account (Stanley, 2006, p6). However, Stanley’s project is of a first 
person character, where knowledge is seen as a concept one applies in order to justify 
one’s actions being based on a particular belief (or, as we find in Williamson, as the 
‘norm of assertion’ – Williamson, 2000). The emphasis is thus on practical facts relating 
to the subject of the knowledge ascription, whereas under our formulation it is the 
practical facts of whichever individual’s situation we are taking into account (of which 
the subject, and indeed the attributor themselves, are merely special cases). I should also 
point out that the analysis Stanley gives is meant only as a token attempt to encapsulate 
the concept of knowledge, the purpose of which is merely to demonstrate the manner in 
which practical facts are to be relevant to knowledge ascriptions. Stanley gives the 
following conditions for knowledge of p (x, w, t and p stand for names of person, worlds, 
times and propositions respectively): 
 
(1) p is true at w  
 
(2) ¬p is not a serious epistemic possibility for x at w and t 
 
(3) If p is a serious practical question for x at t, then ¬p has a sufficiently low epistemic 
probability, given x’s total evidence 
 
(4) x believes at t that p on the basis of non-inferential evidence, or believes that p on the 
basis of a competent inference from propositions that are known by x at t. (Stanley, 2006, 
p89/90) 
 
 
In defending this ‘interest relative invariantism’ against contextualism and relativism, 
Stanley refers to five cases, the last of which I shall quote in full: 
 
‘High Attributor-Low Subject Stakes. Hannah and her wife Sarah are driving home on a Friday 
afternoon. They plan to stop at the bank on the way home to deposit their paychecks. Since they 
have an impending bill coming due, and very little in their account, it is very important that they 
deposit their paychecks by Saturday. Hannah calls up Bill on her cell phone, and asks Bill whether 
the bank will be open on Saturday. Bill replies by telling Hannah, ‘Well, I was there two weeks ago 
on a Saturday, and it was open.’ After reporting the discussion to Sarah, Hannah concludes that, 
since banks do occasionally change their hours, ‘Bill doesn’t really know that the bank will be open 
on Saturday’. (Stanley, 2006, p5). 
 
with Stanley approving Hannah’s final utterance as seeming intuitively correct. There are 
four preceding cases that have similar structure and content: in ‘low stakes’, there is no 
impending bill, and Hannah attributes knowledge to herself about the bank’s opening 
hours, again based on having been there two weeks ago. In ‘high stakes’, Hannah admits 
that she doesn’t know whether the bank will be open, despite having the same evidence, 
because this time there is an impending bill. Stanley thinks that both these assertions are 
intuitively correct, but in ‘low attributor-high subject stakes’, an individual (Jill) – who 
has very little at stake in being correct – attributes knowledge to Hannah, and again it is 
important for Hannah to be right as there is a bill payment due. Stanley feels that this 
time the utterance is intuitively incorrect, even though the ‘low attributor’ could have 
ascribed knowledge to herself based on similar evidence. In ‘ignorant high stakes’, 
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Hannah and Sarah do have a bill due, but are unaware of it, and Hannah thus attributes to 
herself the status of knowledge – but Stanley claims that the intuitive reaction to this case 
is that she does so incorrectly.  
  Let us agree with Stanley’s diagnosis of the appropriateness of knowledge ascriptions in 
each situation (given that the bank is in fact open on Saturday): how do these cases fit 
with the two (Stanley’s, and that presented in this thesis) analyses? As Stanley argues 
convincingly in his book, his interest-relative invariantism gives the correct answer in 
each of the first four cases, but an incorrect answer in the final case (which we quoted 
first) ‘High Attributor – Low Subject Stakes’. Stanley feels Hannah’s final utterance in 
this case to be intuitively correct; however, Bill has nothing at stake (assuming his 
interests to be unconnected to Hannah and Sarah’s) and hence Stanley’s position suggests 
he does know, and that Hannah speaks wrongly. Stanley explains this discrepancy by 
appeal to a psychological pressure for us to project Hannah and Sarah’s practical 
situation onto Bill; that is to say, not to ask whether Bill knows, but whether Hannah or 
Sarah would know if they were in Bill’s situation.  
  On the other hand, the analysis I have presented seems to give the right answer in all 
five cases (so long as Hannah and Sarah meet the general stringency conditions in the 
first two cases – wherein if they do not then intuition has misled us here), because it is the 
practical facts relating to whomever the knowledge ascription is going to be made use of 
by that should be taken into account. If we allow ourselves to understand this ‘projection’ 
described by Stanley in a loose, metaphorical way – that consider relying on someone’s 
evidence is similar to imagining what you would do in their epistemic situation – then 
this seems to coincide with Stanley’s assertion about what is going on in ‘High Attributor 
– Low Subject Stakes’. But then, we may simply disagree with Stanley about whether 
this projection is acceptable (and the intuitions appealed to seem to be on our side).  
  Later in the book, Stanley gives some independent arguments against contextualism – 
the thesis that knowledge ascriptions are context-sensitive (i.e. express different 
propositions in different contexts of use) in a distinctly epistemological way (i.e., the 
evidential standards properly in place depend upon the context of utterance). These are 
mainly linguistic in nature, and draw (primarily grammatical) disanalogies between 
‘know’ and a wide variety of other context-dependent terms. We shall not have time to 
pursue these fully here, as our project is conceptual rather than linguistic. However, a 
common theme of these arguments is that if the term ‘knowledge’ were context-sensitive 
in the required way, then the evidential standards in play could change during a 
conversation in a way that made the utterances of the participants seem intuitively 
infelicitous. To take one of his examples: 
 
‘A. (Looking at a zebra in a normal zoo). I know that is a zebra. 
B. But can you rule out its being a cleverly painted mule? 
A. I guess I can’t rule that out. 
B. So you admit that you don’t know that’s a zebra, and so you were wrong earlier? 
A. I didn’t say I did. I wasn’t considering the possibility that it could be a cleverly painted 
mule.’ (Stanley, 2006, p52) 
 
 
We have said that the evidential standards appropriate to knowledge ascriptions are 
relativised to the practical interests of the person whose interests we are taking into 
 52 
account when making the ascription, if there is such an individual at all (oftentimes there 
will not be). But in a given situation, it is the (fixed) features of that situation that 
determine who we should properly consider that individual – the one who’s interests we 
care about – to be: it is not a matter of where our attention is directed, but of a more rigid 
practical relation to potential action. Hence in our five examples it was Hannah and 
Sarah, because it is their actions that the knowledge ascription (either of another 
individual or themselves) will be used to justify or evaluate the appropriateness of (the 
veracity of a knowledge-ascription might therefore depend on who else was present at the 
time). The position I have advocated is therefore not contextualist in a manner that is 
damaged by these kinds of arguments, where knowledge standards shift within a 
discourse. If the account I have presented is correct, then it is to be expected that we 
cannot equivocate with regards to the individual whose interests are properly counted as 
most salient and still communicate successfully, at least without making explicit what is 
going on. Moreover, this equivocation would only occur if the participants’ 
understanding of the situation and the interests and roles of the people in it were to 
change. Of course, we could construct a situation where this is the case – but if we are 
allowed to alter the participants’ perceptions of the practical facts mid-dialogue then 
similar examples containing shifting evidential standards may be constructed for 
Stanley’s position as well. Hence, our approach seems to have an advantage over 
Stanley’s views, as it predicts the intuitively correct answers in all five test cases. 
 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
We have thus completed our search for clarification of the conceptual practises 
surrounding the concept of knowledge, arriving at a kind of ‘halfway house’ between 
invariantism and contextualism. Whereas Craig (p166) seems to see fit to leave the 
probabilistic threshold connecting X and p as simply ‘very high’, perhaps specified by 
some qualitative condition such as ‘justified in being certain’, we allow for the standard 
to be raised when there is obvious need to do so – when consideration of the purpose for 
which the ascription will be used leads us to raising the standard to fulfil the needs of a 
particularly demanding inquirer. The conditions that encapsulate the prototypical case of 
conceptual ascription are therefore as follows. To be said to know whether p, S must 
have: 
 
1.True belief as to whether p 
 
2. Various agent characteristics enabling him or her to properly ‘tell us whether p’ 
 
3. A detectable property X reliably connected to being right whether p, such that: 
i. The property entails the subject is correct in any possible world a typical attributor is 
seriously considering to be a possibility (given the general background assumptions in place 
in the society) 
ii. The property entails the condition probability P(X|p) of the subject’s being correct 
whether p, given that they possess X, is high enough to meet the general threshold in place 
in the community (i.e. for most everyday, practical purposes) 
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iii. If the knowledge ascription is made in a context where some particular purpose is 
involved (is connected to potential action), the conditional probability is suitably high for 
this purpose 
 
 
We have also seen knowledge ascription is intuitively withheld whenever we describe 
(from the global perspective) situations where the connection only holds by accident in 
this context, and the usual features making the connection reliable are absent.  
  In this thesis I have taken as a starting point the fact the concept of knowledge plays an 
important role in our lives, adopted Craig’s hypothesis for what this role is, and used 
various frameworks to explore the features a concept suited to that role would have. 
These conditions therefore specify the cases where the concept is properly applied.  
  Moreover, the formulations of the infallibilists (having in mind here Unger and the 
exclusion principle) are such that the conditions I have put forth might be satisfied whilst 
their conditions are not. In resisting the application of the concept, we are resisting 
acknowledging that a potential informant is sufficiently qualified for the role: hence 
issues of practical advantage create contrary pressures that counterbalance the pull 
towards certainty, and towards the idealized conceptual practices that follow from 
adopting the infallibilist’s absolutist concept of knowledge in our actual usage. Indeed, 
we have seen that it is this opposition of contrary forces that creates the tension in the 
concept of knowledge that enables such a fierce debate to exist at all (c.f. Craig, p 113). 
But, to return to the semantic question mentioned at the beginning of this thesis, do these 
conditions specifying when it is appropriate to attribute knowledge to the subject stem 
from the intrinsic semantics of the term ‘knowledge’ itself, or are they more like 
guidelines for appropriate deviation from its intrinsic semantics in actual usage 
(specifically with an eye to 3.iii)? 
  The contextualist suggests that knowledge ascriptions are literally correct whenever the 
purpose of the concept is met: when in doing so we are flagging a (partly contextually 
determined) suitable informant; the invariantist recognizes the practical advantage of 
making knowledge ascriptions where there is a chance the subject in question may be 
wrong, but claims they are, strictly speaking, not literally true. 
  In his book ‘Philosophical Relativity’ Peter Unger argues that the empirical facts of 
usage underdetermine the answer to this question; that given the complexity inherent in 
correct usage (for example, as characterised above), there is no principled way to 
apportion the complexity inherent in usage between the intrinsic semantics of the term 
‘knowledge’ and pragmatic considerations pertaining only to how the term is (properly) 
used (Unger, 1984). But whilst this might be true, we have nevertheless achieved the 
purpose we set out with: to clarify the linguistic practices surrounding the concept of 
knowledge. If we were correct in claiming that knowledge as a phenomenon is delineated 
by the usage of its concept then it is these conditions of proper application that contain 
the interesting questions, and not the issues relating to how this is explained in terms of 
the underlying semantics. As Craig puts it: 
 
‘My ‘practical explication’ or ‘state of nature’ method leads to an account of the linguistic practice 
surrounding the word ‘know’ and its near relatives; it does not determine how we are to apportion 
the underlying mechanics of the practice between invariant semantics and contextually motivated 
pragmatics’.  
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If Unger’s relativity thesis is true then this is the best we could have hoped for; if not, 
then the linguistic question is simply something we are not required to address (and, it 
seems, not something that this style of explanation is able to address). 
  Having thus reached the end of the project, we can also see that there is great scope for 
further research using the same methodology. One line of enquiry to be pursued would be 
a state of nature–style investigation into the features we should expect a concept suited to 
the (related) role of being the ‘norm of assertion’ should have – or the role of providing 
an underpinning or justification for one’s actions: this is the first-person project 
mentioned in chapter 2. Indeed, there are not just one but a family of knowledge-like 
concepts, each bearing certain ‘family resemblances’ to each other in their application 
and the role they fulfil (c.f. Kusch, 2011, who provides a link between Craig’s work and 
that of the later Wittgenstein). Craig discusses constructions relating to several more in 
his book – knowing Fred, which, further to simply knowing certain propositions about 
Fred, entails some kind of capacity to interact with Fred – and knowing London, and 
German (Craig, section XVI). Another project would be to strengthen the methodology 
by a more detailed empirical account of conceptual acquisition.  
  That there are further lines of enquiry open does not show that the project I set out to 
undertake has not been properly completed, and of course the same goes for Craig. 
Rather, this is what one should expect from this kind of naturalistic endeavour, as one 
would hope it to inherit aspects of research procedure from the natural sciences, where 
research efforts of one individual may add to those of another, rather than replacing them. 
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